University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 33
Issue 1 Fall 2003

Article 2

2003

Judicial Modification of Sentences in Maryland
Steven P. Grossman
University of Baltimore School of Law, sgrossman@ubalt.edu

Stephen J. Shapiro
University of Baltimore School of Law, sshapiro@ubalt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Grossman, Steven P. and Shapiro, Stephen J. (2003) "Judicial Modification of Sentences in Maryland," University of Baltimore Law
Review: Vol. 33: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol33/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

JUDICIAL MODIFICATION OF SENTENCES
IN MARYLAND
Professor Steven Grossmant
Professor Stephen Shapirott
INTRODUCTION

1.

In Maryland, judges who hand out criminal sentences have very
broad power to subsequently reduce those sentences. 1 The sentencingjudge may reduce a sentence at any time for any reason, as long as
the defendant has filed a motion to modify the sentence within ninety
days.2 Not only does the judge retain this power throughout the entirety of the defendant's sentence, it also allows him to modify a sentence to Probation Before Judgment ("PBj") after the original
sentence was served.
Although judges in most states have some power to revise sentences,
in almost all others there is a time limit ranging from one week to one
year, unless the modification is to correct a mistake or an illegal sentence. 3 In the very few other states that give judges a longer period to
modify a sentence, there are normally severe restrictions imposed. 4
In the last few years, the broad power of Maryland judges to modify
sentences has come under attack from many sources, including prose-
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Professor Steven Grossman is the Dean Julius Isaacson Professor of Law at
the University of Baltimore School of Law. He holds a bachelor of arts
degree from the City College of New York, a law degree from Brooklyn Law
School, and an LLM from New York University. Professor Grossman has
written on such topics as eyewitness identification, sentencing and the use
of hearsay evidence. He is a member of the New York Bar, the Board of
Governors of the Judicial Institute of Maryland and the Board of Directors
of MICPEL.
Professor Stephen Shapiro is a Professor of Law at the University of
Baltimore School of Law. He holds a bachelor of arts degree from
Haverford College and a law degree from the University of Pennsylvania.
He has published numerous law review articles in the areas of civil rights,
federal jurisdiction and procedure, government ethics, and evidence. He
recently returned from the University of Mainz, Germany after receiving a
Fulbright Fellowship for research.
Sentence reduction is controlled by Rule 4-345 of the Maryland Rules. MD.
R. 4-345(b) (2003). See infra note 16 and accompanying text for the text of
this rule.
See State v. Robinson, 106 Md. App. 720, 723, 666A.2d 909, 911(1995). See
infra notes 18-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case. See
also MD. R. 4-345(b).
See infra Part III (reviewing the law in other states).
See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
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cutors, victims' rights advocates, members of the state legislature, and
the media. 5 Those opposing the practice have cited a few specific
cases where the power has been abused, such as when violent
criminals serving long sentences were released early without notification to victims. 6 Recent amendments to the law have added significant procedural safeguards to the process, such as a requirement of a
hearing, notice to victims, and a requirement of a decision, with explanation, on the record. 7
Yet opponents of the practice would still like to see it abolished or
significantly curtailed. One bill, introduced during the 2002 legislative session, would have imposed a one-year time limit on any sentence modifications. 8 The bill was quite controversial and received
support from the then Lieutenant Governor, as well as victims' rights
groups and prosecutors. 9 The bill was opposed by both the criminal
defense bar and by virtually all trial judges. lo
During legislative hearings, it became clear that no one had an accurate picture of just how often and in what kinds of cases sentence
modification was used. This was because virtually no jurisdictions or
individual judges kept accurate and complete records of the granting
and denial of such requests.
The authors of this Article were members of a task force formed by
the Maryland State Bar Association ("MSBA") to conduct a study of
the practice in Maryland. II The most important piece of this study
5. On February 4 and 5, 2001, the Washington Post ran two front-page articles
criticizing the broad discretion given to judges in Maryland to reduce
sentences, the use of that power by Maryland judges, and the failure of the
legislature to act to amend the law. Lori Montgomery & Daniel LeDuc,
Crime, Punishment-Shaped by One Man; Loopholes Undo Mandatory Sentences,
WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Loopholes]; Lori Montgomery
& Daniel LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality; judges Can Cut Terms for Whatever
Reason-or No Reason, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Sentences
Without Finality].
6. See, e.g., Montgomery & LeDuc, Loopholes, supra note 5 (describing a Maryland judge's use of sentencing modification power to cut the sentence of a
man convicted of drug dealing and illegal possession of a handgun from
twelve to five years); Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra
note 5 (describing another instance in which a judge reduced a five-year
prison sentence to probation, thereby releasing a man who had killed another man in an altercation over money).
7. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (describing the amendments).
8. S. 73, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2002); H.D. 160, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Md. 2002).
9. On January 13, 2002, the Washington Post reported that "Townsend (D)
has pledged that one of her top priorities this year is legislation to limit
judges' ability to reduce criminals' time in prison . . . . " Daniel LeDuc,
Townsend Seeks to Curb judge's Rnle in Md. Legislature, Victim Advocates Target
Power to Cut Sentences Years Later, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2002, at C4.
10. Id.
11. Professor Grossman was chair of the Committee. In addition to Professor
Shapiro, other members of the Committee included Professor Jose Anderson of the University of Baltimore and Buzz Winchester of the MSBA.
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was a survey of all district and circuit court judges in Maryland. The
Survey questioned the judges about their use of sentence modification, including how often they used the procedure, how long after
sentencing, the types of cases in which modification was used, and the
reasons for its uses. 12 The results of the Survey were reported to the
criminal justice council of the MSBA and to the Maryland General
Assembly. 13
This Article grew out of that Survey and represents the views of the
authors only and not the MSBA. Part II of this Article will first explain
the law relating to, and history of, the judges' revisory power in Maryland. Part III will examine the law in other states and in federal
courts. The Article will then look at how the purposes of sentence
modification fit with various theories of punishment. Part V will review arguments for and against the procedure and explore alternatives for accomplishing the same goals. Part VI will report and
interpret the results of the Survey of Maryland judges. Finally, the
authors will give their conclusions as to the use of sentence modification in Maryland and their recommendations for any changes in the
law.
The authors conclude that the overwhelming majority of cases in
which the practice is used are for non-violent drug and theft offenses,
where the possibility of sentence modification is a powerful incentive
toward the completion of drug and alcohol treatment programs or
toward restitution to the victim. Even many critics of the practice do
not oppose its use in these cases. Although modification for these
purposes normally takes place within one year of sentencing, there are
many instances where judges need two or even three years to confirm
that the defendant has completed his or her rehabilitation. A oneyear time limit would significantly interfere with this process.
Sentence modification for persons serving more serious, often violent crimes, is much more controversial; although the number is
much smaller, some cases do exist. In a few cases, the system has been
abused or judges have failed to follow proper procedural guidelines.
The authors believe, however, that, although sentence reduction
should be used carefully and sparingly in cases where long prison
sentences have been handed down, it is a useful tool in some cases
and should not be restricted to only certain crimes or to a certain time
period.
It is important that the procedural safeguards be strictly followed
and that some form of centralized record-keeping be maintained.
These protections would eliminate most improper uses of sentence
12. See infra Part VI; Appendix.
13. Professors Grossman and Anderson, along with Mr. Winchester, testified
before the House Judiciary Committee on March 11, 2003. The results of
the judges' survey were presented to the Senate Committee on Judicial Proceedings on February 27, 2003.
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modification. They will also allow sentence modification to continue
in the many cases where it is helpful to the rehabilitation of non-violent offenders, and in the few cases where it is warranted, even when
the defendant has committed a serious crime of violence.
II.

THE MARYLAND LAW OF SENTENCE MODIFICATION

Ajudge's power to modify a sentence in a criminal case is not new
to Maryland law. As early as 1890, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
recognized "the long-established principle that courts have power to
set aside or change their judgments during the term at which they are
entered."14 Since 1951, this power has been specified by court rules. 15
The current governing rule reads, in pertinent part:
Rule 4-345. Sentencing - Revisory power of court.
(b) Modification or reduction - Time for. The court has revisory power and control over a sentence upon a motion
filed within 90 days after its imposition (1) in the District
Court, if an appeal has not been perfected, and (2) in a circuit court, whether or not an appeal has been filed. Thereafter, the court has revisory power and control over the
sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity, or as provided in section (e) of this Rule. The court may not increase
a sentence after the sentence has been imposed, except that
it may correct an evident mistake in the announcement of a
sentence if the correction is made on the record before the
defendant leaves the courtroom following the sentencing
proceeding. 16
The rule is clear that a judge has the power to modify a legally imposed sentence-not tainted by fraud, mistake or irregularity-only if
the defendant files a motion within ninety days of its imposition. 17
This requirement was held to be jurisdictional and has been strictly
enforced. What is not so clear from the language of the rule is how
long this power continues after a defendant has filed a timely motion.
Must the judge rule on the motion within some time limit, or may he
hold it sub cuna for the length of the sentence?
Under the current rule, the question of whether there was any time
limitation on a judge's power to reduce a properly imposed criminal
sentence l8 was specifically addressed by the Court of Special Appeals
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

State v. Butler, 72 Md. 98, 100, 18 A. 1105, 1106 (1890).
See Robinson v. State, 106 Md. App. 720, 722-23, 666 A.2d 909, 911 (1995).
MD. R. 4-345(b) (2003).
Id.
This article addresses only the question of a judge's power to reduce, not
increase a sentence. Ajudge's power to increase a sentence is limited to
correcting "an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence if the
correction is made on the record before the defendant leaves the court-
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of Maryland in State v. Robinson. 19 In Robinson, the defendant was
given a ten-year sentence in 1990 for various crimes, including assault
with intent to maim. 20 Defendant filed a timely motion for sentence
modification within ninety days of the imposition of the sentence. 2 !
In 1994, four and one-half years after it had been imposed, the trial
judge, following a hearing on the motion, modified the sentence by
suspending the unserved portion of it and imposing a term of fiveyears probation. 22 The state appealed, claiming that the trial judge
lacked the authority to modify a sentence four and one-half years after
it was imposed. 23 The court of special appeals, after a thorough review of the history of sentence modification in Maryland, held that a
judge does have the power to modify the sentence at any time, as long
as the motion to modify was filed within ninety days of the imposition
of the sentence. 24
The court began its analysis by noting that under the common law,
a court in Maryland had revisory power over its judgments, including
the power to modify sentences, "only during the term of court in
which the judgment was issued."25 That limitation was changed in
1951 by Rule lO(c) of the General Rules of Practice and Procedure. 26
This rule provided the court the power to reduce a sentence within
ninety days of its imposition. 27 The court had this power whether the
defendant had moved for such modification or not, and retained this
power for ninety days even if the term of one court might have expired and another begun. 28 The purpose of the new rule was to "ameliorate the harshness of the former practice."29

19.
20.
21.
22.

23.
24.

25.

26.

27.
28.

29.

room following the sentencing proceeding." Id. This restnctJon is required by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V. This article also does not address the question
of ajudge's power to correct an "illegal" sentence, which may be done "at
any time." MD. R. 4-345(a).
106 Md. App. 720, 666 A.2d 909.
Id. at 721, 666 A.2d at 910.
Id.
Id. at 721-22, 666 A.2d at 910.
Id.
Id. at 724, 666 A.2d at 912.
Id. at 722, 666 A.2d at 910; see also Ayre v. State, 291 Md. 155, 159-60, 433
A.2d 1150, 1153 (1981); State v. Butler, 72 Md. 98, 100-01, 18 A. 1105, 1106
(1890) (discussing the Maryland common law rule dealing with modification of judgments).
See generally Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 434, 109 A.2d 96, 100 (1954)
(discussing the General Rules of Practice and Procedure, Part 4, Rule
10(c».
Id. The rule applied in all criminal cases except those involving bastardy,
desertion, and non-support. Id.
Robinson, 106 Md. App. at 722-23, 666 A.2d at 911.
Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 29,40,333 A.2d 37, 43 (1975). Under the former
practice, the jurisdiction of the court to modify a sentence expired after the
term in which the judgment had been entered. [d.
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According to the Robinson court, "the time period within which a
judge could modify [a] sentence was significantly expanded" in 1961
by Maryland Rule 764(b), which allowed the judge to modify a sentence "[£Jor a period of ninety (90) days ... after the imposition of a
sentence ... or thereafter pursuant to motion filed within such period . .. ."30
This gave the trial court two available periods within which it could
modify a sentence: within ninety days without a motion from counsel,
or "thereafter" as long as a motion was filed within ninety days.31 The
Robinson court determined that "[t]he term 'thereafter' was open-ended and there is no other reading that can be given it."32
Present Rule 4-345 (b), and the rule in place when Robinson was decided, reads in pertinent part: "The court has revisory power and control over a sentence upon a motion filed within 90 days after its
imposition ... ."33 The Robinson court interpreted this rule as taking
away the judge's power to modify sentences sua sponte, but leaving the
judge's power to modify pursuant to a timely motion intact without
any time limitations. 34 The court stated that "[t]he second and longer
time period for modification, triggered by the filing of a motion
within 90 days, no longer enjoys the presence of the word 'thereafter'
but is no less open ended."35
The state recognized that the ninety-day time limit for filing the
motion might extend into a new term of court, but it argued that the
judge's power to grant that motion would end upon termination of
that succeeding term. 36 The court rejected the state's argument,
which would have engrafted a remnant of the old common law rule
onto the new Rule. 37
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has not specifically addressed the
issue of whether there is any time limitation on a judge's power to
revise a sentence, but it has given its seeming approval to the Robinson
approach in Greco v. State. 38 In that case, the trial court had granted a
defendant's Motion for Reduction of Sentence eight years after imposition of the original sentence. 39 The defendant then filed another
motion to modify within ninety days of the sentence reduction. 4o The
30.
31.
32.
33.

34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.
40.

Robinson, 106 Md. App. at 723, 666 A.2d at 911; MD. R. 764(b) (1) (1957).
Robinson, 106 Md. App. at 723,666 A.2d at 911.
Id.
CompareMo.R.4-345(b) (2003),withMo.R.4-345(b) (1995). SeealsoRobinson, 106 Md. App. at 723, 666 A.2d at 911. The change from Rule
764(b)(l) to Rule 4-345(b) was made as part of the recodification of the
Maryland Criminal Rules in 1984. Court of Appeals, Order of Apr. 6, 1984,
effective July 1, 1984.
Robinson, 106 Md. App. at 723,666 A.2d at 911.
Id.
Id. at 723-24, 666 A.2d at 911.
Id. at 723-24, 666 A.2d at 911-12.
347 Md. 423, 701 A.2d 419 (1997).
Id. at 426, 701 A.2d at 420.
Id.
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actual issue facing the court of appeals was whether the sentence reduction should be treated as an imposition of sentence, which would
allow the defendant ninety days to file a second motionY In holding
that it was an imposition of sentence, the court at least tacitly approved the original modification, even though it was eight years after
the original sentencing. 42
Additionally, the Greco court cited Robinson for the proposition that
there is no time limit on ajudge's power to modify.43 It also acknowledged that the Rules Committee had considered and rejected a recommendation that the rule be amended to impose a time limitation
on the power to modify.44 The Court of Appeals of Maryland, however, took note of two federal cases in which the court refused to allow
sentence modification, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b), after eighteen and thirty months respectively.45 Nevertheless, the court intimated that federal cases were not very helpful when
interpreting the Maryland rule because of the much more limited
power given judges under the federal rule. 46
The Maryland courts' reading of Rule 4-345(b), although reasonable, is not the only plausible interpretation. The appellate courts of
one state with a rule similar to Maryland's have imposed a duty on the
trial judge to rule "within a reasonable time after its filing."47 Rule
35 (b) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure reads, in pertinent part: "The court may reduce the sentence provided that a motion for reduction of sentence is filed ... within 120 days after the
sentence is imposed .... "48 In Colorado v. Fuqua, the defendant had
filed a timely motion to modify.49 The trial court, however, "apparently laboring under the notion that its jurisdiction was interminable,
failed to rule on the motion until approximately eighteen months following the expiration of the 120-day filing period."50 The Supreme
Court of Colorado held that the sentencing court was under a duty to
act "within a reasonable period of time," and if it did not so act, then
it "becomes the defendant's obligation to make reasonable efforts to
secure an expeditious ruling on the motion."51 If the defendant fails
41. Id. at 431-32, 701 A.2d at 423.
See id.
See id. at 435, 701 A.2d at 424-25.
See id., at 424-25, 701 A.2d at 435.
[d. at 435-36, 701 A.2d at 425; see also United States v. Taylor, 768 F.2d 114,
118 (6th Cir. 1985) (questioning whether a delay of eighteen months in
ruling on a Rule 35(b) motion is reasonable); Diggs v. United States, 740
F.2d 239, 24~7 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that a decision on a Rule 35(b)
motion was untimely thirty months after sentencing).
46. See Greco, 347 Md. at 436-37, 701 A.2d at 425-26.
47. Colo. v. Fuqua, 764 P.2d 56, 61 & n.4 (1988).
48. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (1998).
49. Fuqua, 764 P.2d at 58.
50. Id. at 61.
51. Id.
42.
43.
44.
45.
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to do so, "the motion for reduction should be deemed abandoned."52
The Colorado court made this ruling based on policy, rather than statutory construction. They held that a timely ruling was necessary to
give "due deference to the principle of finality," "to relieve the sentenced defendant of needless uncertainty" and to allow "the Department of Corrections to structure a suitable program for the inmate
and assign him to an appropriate correctional facility .... "53
Until 1984, Federal Rule 35(b) was also similar to Maryland's present rule in that it allowed a court to modify a sentence if the defendant had filed a motion to modify within the rule's specified period of
time-120 days for federal cases and ninety days for Maryland cases. 54
Although the rule did not contain a time limit on the court's action,
the appellate courts read a requirement of "within a reasonable time"
into the rule. 55 In 1985, it was amended to contain this explicitly. 56
As noted above, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Greco v. State,
placed little weight on the federal cases which read a "reasonable
time" limit into the federal rule because that rule is quite different
than Maryland's, giving the judge virtually no opportunity to modify a
sentence. 57 But the court failed to note that those opinions were written before the 1985 and 1987 amendments restricting federal judges'
powers and were interpreting the federal rule when it was much more
similar to the Maryland rule. 58
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (1983) & Advisory Committee's Notes; MD. R.
4.345(b) (2003) (amended 1992 & 2001).
55. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b); see, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 768 F.2d 114,
116-17 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985) (observing that "a majority of circuits" viewed
"that the district courts retain jurisdiction for a reasonable time beyond the
120 day period to consider timely Rule 35 motions"; this view was moot
after Rule 35 was amended in 1987 to completely take away ajudge's power
to amend a valid sentence); Diggs v. United States, 740 F.2d 239, 245 (3d
Cir. 1984) (holding that a district court has a "reasonable time" to decide a
Rule 35(b) motion after the 12O-day limit); United States v. Krohn, 700
F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the district court retainsjurisdiction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days if a motion to
reduce a sentence is properly filed within 120 days). But cf United States v.
Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 1983), em. denied, 464 U.S. 1047 (1984)
("LW]e have serious doubts whether a district judge can ever reduce a sentence under Rule 35(b) after the 12O-day time limit has passed.").
56. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (1985) & Advisory Committee's Notes; see also United
States v. Hayes, 983 F.2d 78, 80 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that Congress
amended the rule in 1985 in reaction to the court's holding in United States
v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1983), the pre-1985 version "onlyauthorized District Courts to reduce sentences within 120 days"). The rule was
amended again in 1987 to repeal the 120-day limit altogether. Hayes, 983
F.2d at 81.
57. See 347 Md. 423, 434-37,701 A.2d 419, 424-26 (1997); see also supra note 46
and accompanying text.
58. See generally Greco, 347 Md. at 433-35, 701 A.2d at 424.
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The fact that a judge may act on a motion years after it was filed,
based on facts that were not in existence-or perhaps even contemplated-at the time of the motion, makes the Maryland procedure
unique, not only in regard to sentence modification but in almost any
area of the law. Broadly speaking, a motion is a request for a court to
issue an order. 59 Normally, a motion must state the grounds for why it
should be granted, based on facts in existence at the time the motion
is made. 60 The motion is usually granted or denied within a reasonable time after being made, based on the facts presented in the motion.
In some cases, the motion may be held by the court until some later
part of the judicial process. For example, under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pretrial motions are normally "heard
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the
court orders that the hearing and determination thereof be deferred
until the trial."61
There are few areas of the law in which final judgments may be
modified years after being made. With injunctions and other equitable orders, for example, the issuing court retains permanent jurisdiction to modify or dissolve the order. 62 This, however, usually must be
done by motion at the time the modification is requested, showing a
change in circumstances between the time of its issuance and the time
the motion is made. 63
It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that the Maryland courts have
given Rule 4-345 such a broad interpretation. The court was clearly
influenced by the language of the earlier version that allowed a court
to modify a sentence "[£Jor a period of ninety (90) days after the imposition of a sentence . . . or thereafter, pursuant to motion filed
within such period .... "64 Obviously, the drafters of this rule contemplated the granting of a motion after the ninety day period and chose
to use the open-ended term "thereafter," rather than a phrase such as
"within a reasonable time thereafter."65 It was not, therefore, unreasonable for the Robinson court to interpret the framer's intent of that
earlier version as setting no time limit on the granting of a motion
pursuant to a timely motion. The court was further justified in its
interpretation because the rule's legislative history lacked evidence
demonstrating a desire to impose such a time limit when the rule was
modified as part of the 1984 recodification. 66
59. A motion is a "written or oral application requesting a court to make a
specified ruling or order." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1031 (7th ed. 1999).
60. FED. R. CN. P. 7(b), l1(b) (2001).
61. Id. at 12(d).
62. 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions § 302 (2000).
63. Id. § 306.
64. MD. R. 764(b) (1957).
65. Id.
66. See supra note 33.
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There has been only one amendment to Rule 4-345 since Robinson,
and that involves not the timing, but the procedure used in sentence
modification. 67 The 2001 amendment requires the State's Attorney to
"give notice to each victim and victim's representative who has filed a
Crime Victim Notification Request form" when a sentence reduction
hearing is to be held. 68 The amendment gives each victim, or victim's
representative, the right to attend and testify at any such hearing.6g
Additionally, the rule requires the court to make a determination that
the notice requirements have been complied with before holding the
hearing.70 Finally, "[i]f the court grants the motion, [it] ordinarily
shall prepare and file or dictate into the record a statement setting
forth the reasons on which the ruling is based."71
III.

THE LAW IN OTHER STATES AND IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS

One of the arguments asserted by critics of Maryland judges' revisory power is that Maryland is the only state that gives judges unfettered discretion, with no time limitation, to modify legally imposed
sentences. 72 It is correct that the overwhelming majority of states give
the judge one year or less to modify a sentence. 73 There are a handful
of other states that allow longer time periods, but most of those impose strict limitations on the kinds of situations where this power may
be used. Only two other states seem to have a power as broad, or
nearly as broad, as in Maryland. 74
Most states allow an illegal sentence (i.e. one that exceeded the
maximum penalty) to be corrected at any time,75 but put much
67. See MD. R. 4-345 (2003) (amended 2001). Robinson was decided in 1995.
State v. Robinson, 106 Md. App. 720, 666 A.2d 909 (1995).
68. MD. R. 4-345(c).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 4-345(d).
7l. Id.
72. See Robinson, 106 Md. App. at 724, 666 A.2d at 912 (holding that Rule 4345(b) engrafts no time limitation on the period within which ajudge may
act on a modification, "so long as the triggering condition of the filing of a
motion within 90 days of the imposition of the sentence has been
satisfied") .
73. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
74. See ALA. CODE § 15-18-8(c) (1995 & Supp. 2002) (stating that the court retains jurisdiction throughout the sentence and may suspend that portion of
the minimum sentence that remains); HAw. R. PENAL P. 35(b) (2003) (stating that a motion to reduce a sentence made within ninety days "shall empower the court to act on such motion even though the time period has
expired"). See also infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
75. Many states have patterned their statutes or rules relating to correction of
illegal sentences upon former Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, usually using the exact language of the former federal rule. See, e.g.,
DEL. CT. C.P.R. 35(a) (2003) ("Correction of sentence. - The court may
correct an illegal sentence at any time .... "); MD. R. 4-345 (a) (2003) ("Illegal Sentence. The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.").
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tighter limits on ajudge's power to modify a legally imposed sentence.
The vast m~ority of states either deny judges any power to modify
sentences 76 or give judges varying time limits between thirty days and
one year to modify a sentence. 77 The most common time limits are
ninety78 and 12079 days, although five states have a shorter limit,80 and
eight have either a 180-day or a one-year limit. 81 In most states, the
judge must actually reduce the sentence within the time limit. 82 In a
few states, if the defendant makes a motion to modify within the limit,
the court has "a reasonable time" thereafter to rule on the motion. 83
Some of the states with a time limit of one year or less allow a longer
or unlimited time period for modification, but impose severe restrictions on its use after the normal time limit expires. For example, in
both California and Kansas, judges can modify sentences after 120
days only upon recommendation of the Director of Corrections. 84 In
Delaware, a sentence may be modified after ninety days only in "ex76. Those states that do not appear to give trial judges statutory power to reduce legal sentences include Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, South Carolina, and Texas.
77. See infra notes 78-81.
78. Those states with a ninety day limit include: Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-90-111(b)(l) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 2003)); Delaware (DEL. CT. C.P.R.
35(b) (2003)); Minnesota (MINN. R. CRlM. P. 28.05(1), (2) (1995 & Supp.
2003)); New Mexico (N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-801 (b) (2003)); and Vermont (VT.
CODE R. 35(b) (1983 & Supp. 2003)).
79. Those states with a 120 day limit include: California (CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170(d) (West 1985 & Supp. 2003)); Colorado (COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35(b)
(1998 & Supp. 2002)); District of Columbia (D.C. R. CRIM. P. 35(b)
(2003)); Idaho (IDAHO R. CRlM. P. 35 (2003)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-4603(d)(I)-(2) (1995)); North Dakota (N.D. R. CRlM. P. 35(b)
(2002)); Pennsylvania (PA. R. CRIM. P. 720(B) (3)(a) (2001 & Supp. 2003));
Rhode Island (R.I. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) (2003)); Tennessee (TENN. R. CRlM. P.
35(b) (2003)); and West Virginia (w. VA. R. CRlM. P. 35(b) (2003)).
80. Those states with a time limit shorter than ninety or 120 days include: Florida (FlA. R. CRIM. P. 3.800(c) (1999 & Supp. 2003) (sixty days)); Illinois
(730 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-1(c) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003) (thirty
days)); Louisiana (LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 822(A)(I),(C),
881.1(A) (1) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003) (thirty days)); Massachusetts (MAss.
R. CRlM. P. 29(a) (2002) (sixty days)); and New Jersey (NJ. R. CRlM. P. 3:2110(a) (2003) (seventy-five days)).
81. Those states with a 180 day or one-year limit include: Alaska (AlAsKA STAT.
§ 12.55.088(a) (Michie 2002) (180 days)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 17-101(0 (1997 & Supp. 2003) (one year)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-117(a) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2003) (one year)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 902.4 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003) (one year)); Oklahoma (OKlA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 982(a)(A) (West 1986 & Supp. 2003) (one year)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 23A-31-1 (Michie 1998) (one year)); Wisconsin
(WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.19(2) (West 1998 & Supp. 2002) (180 days)); and
Wyoming (WYo. R. CRlM. P. 35(b) (2003) (one year)).
82. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., D.C. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (2003); 730 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/5-8l(c) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
84. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d) (West 1985 & Supp. 2003); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4603(e) (1995).
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traordinary circumstances,"85 and in Indiana after 365 days with approval of the prosecuting attorney.86 In Wisconsin, where judges by
statute have up to 180 days to modify sentences,87 the state supreme
court has held that sentencing courts have the "inherent power" to
modifY sentences during the entire term of the sentence, but only
when "new factors" have been shown. 88 The Wisconsin courts have
interpreted "new factor" very narrowly, not encompassing either the
defendant's rehabilitation,89 or a court's reconsideration of the fairness of the sentence based on a reweighing of the facts known at
sentencing. 90
Presumably, those states with a short period for modification-120
days or less-did not intend that it be used either as a reward or a
response to a defendant's rehabilitation-as it can be and often is
used in Maryland-because little in the way of rehabilitation could be
accomplished in such a short time. Rather, the most likely purpose of
such statutes is to give the defendant an opportunity to ask the judge
to reconsider the fairness of the original sentence, or to consider additional information that existed at the time of sentencing but was not
presented. For example, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts stated:
"Occasions inevitably will occur where a conscientious judge, after reflection or upon receipt of new probation reports or other information, will feel that he has been too harsh or has failed to give due
weight to mitigating factors which properly should have been taken
into account."91
In fact, some courts have held that a judge may not consider the
defendant's behavior during incarceration following the sentence in
deciding a motion to modify.92 In those states with a one-year limit,
the modification power might be useful for rehabilitation purposes in
at least some cases where the original sentence was not more than a
few years.

85. DEL. CT. C.P.R. 35(b) (2003).
86. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-17(b) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2003). Additionally,
Indiana does allow sentence modification without approval of the prosecuting attorney where the court could have originally placed the defendant in
a community corrections program and did not, but later does make such
placement. Id. (Supp. 2003).
87. WIS. STAT. A,'IN. § 973.19(2) (West 1998 & Supp. 2002) (stating that the
court shall, within ninety days after a motion to modifY is filed, either determine the motion or extend the time for doing so by not more than an
additional ninety days).
88. Wis. v. Kluck, 563 N.w.2d 468, 470 (1997).
89. Id. at 471.
90. Wis. v. Grindemann, 648 N.W.2d 507, 515 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
91. Dist. Attorney for the N. Dist. v. Super. Ct., 172 N.E.2d 245, 250-51 (Mass.
1961).
92. See, e.g., In re Clark, 608 N.E.2d lO60, lO63 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
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Judges in only two other states seem to have the kind of broad powers given to Maryland judges. 93 In Hawaii, pursuant to Rule 35 of the
Rules of Penal Procedure, defendants have ninety days to file a motion to reduce their sentences. 94 Once the motion is made within the
time period, the court is empowered "to act on such motion even
though the time period has expired."95 There are no reported cases
that place a time limit on the court's actions. There are, however, also
no cases in which an appellate court has specifically approved a sentence reduction long after the ninety day filing limit. In Alabama,
although a judge may only modify a sentence within thirty days of its
imposition, the court retains jurisdiction throughout the sentence "to
suspend that portion of the minimum sentence that remains and
place the defendant on probation .... "96 Therefore, although Alabama judges have limited power to modify a sentence, they have significant and extended powers to have defendants released from
prison before their sentences are served.
As this review shows, critics of sentence modification in Maryland
are correct that Maryland law gives judges some of the broadest, if not
the broadest, powers to modify sentences of all fifty states. It is one of
only a handful of states that give judges both the time and discretion
to use sentence modification as a rehabilitation tool. This unique status does not necessarily mean that Maryland law should be changed,
but probably does put the burden of proof on those supporting the
practice to show that it has benefits in comparison to the law of other
states.
As for federal practice, not surprisingly, federal judges' power to
modify sentences has been severely curtailed, along with the narrowing of their discretion in original sentencing, with the imposition of
strict, mandatory guidelines. Until a 1987 amendment, federal judges
had the power to correct an illegal sentence "at any time," and the
power to reduce a sentence for any reason sua sponte within 120 days
or within a reasonable time after 120 days pursuant to a motion filed
by the defendant within that period. 97 That rule was similar to the
rules now in effect in the majority of states, and in fact, many states'
rules were patterned after the federal rule.
93. See ALA. CODE § 15-8-8(c) (1995 & Supp. 2002) (stating that the court re-

94.
95.
96.
97.

tains jurisdiction throughout the sentence and may suspend that portion of
the minimum sentence that remains); HAW. R. PENAL P. 35(b) (2003) (stating that a motion to reduce a sentence made within ninety days "shall empower the court to act on such motion even though the time period has
expired").
HAw. R. PENAL P. 35(b).
Id.
ALA. CODE § 15-18-8(c).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (1983); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (2003) & Advisory Committee's Notes.
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In 1987, at the same time that Congress mandated a sentencing system in which judges' discretion in sentencing was narrowed, Federal
Rule 35 was amended also to curtail significantly federal judges , ability
to reduce sentences. 98 Whereas courts previously had unlimited time
to correct an illegal sentence, they now are given only seven days to
"correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or
other clear error."99 Sentence reduction sua sponte or by motion of
the defendant for any other reason was completely eliminated. 100
Other than the ability to correct "errors" within seven days, courts may
only modify sentences upon motion of the government-usually
within one year, but with some exceptions-and only if "the defendant, after sentencing, provided substantial assistance in investigating
or prosecuting another person."IOI Any sentence reduction under
this rule must also be in accord with "the Sentencing Commission's
guidelines and policy statements."102
In addition to their power under Rule 35, federal judges also have
the statutory power to reduce sentences in three very limited circumstances. 103 The first two may only be done pursuant to a motion by
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, either for: "extraordinary and
compelling reasons," or if "the defendant is "at least 70 years of age,
has served at least 30 years in prison," and "is not a danger to the
safety of any other person or the community."104 The third way can
be done by the court sua sponte or upon a motion of the defendant in
cases where the defendant "has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered
by the Sentencing Commission ... if such a reduction is consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission."105
IV.

THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT

In order to best determine if the sentencing revisory power given
judges is appropriate, it is critical to analyze which theories of punishment are part of a particular sovereign's penology goals, and then see
if the revisory power meets these goals. Most experts separate the
goals of punishment into four dominant theories: incapacitation, de98. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (a), (b) (2003) & Advisory Committee's Notes.
99. Id. at 35(a).
100. See id. at 35(b) & Advisory Committee's Notes. Prior to the 1987 amendment, Rule 35 read, in relevant part, that "[a] motion to reduce a sentence
may be made, or the court may reduce a sentence without motion, within
120 days after the sentence is imposed or probation is revoked .... " Id.
101. Id. at 35(b) (l)(A).
102. Id. at 35(b)(1)(B).
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2000).
104. Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
105. Id. § 3582(c) (2).
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terrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. l06 Each theory needs to be
completely understood before applied to a system that employs sentencing revision as a tool.
The first three of these theories are essentially utilitarian in nature. \07 That is, they look primarily to the future and hope to achieve
a specific goal through the sentence imposed on the defendant. 108
When a system's sentencing ranges for a defendant are based in whole
or in part on an individual or combination of these theories, it is making a statement regarding future goals for the defendant and others,
and how it plans to achieve those goals. 109
The fourth theory, retribution, is only utilitarian by happenstance
and is instead based upon principles of justice and morality.l1O A sentencing system based on this theory is not primarily concerned with
the modification or control of the defendant and others' behavior
through the sentence imposed on the defendant, but instead on
achieving justice for the government, defendant, and victim. III This
difference is crucial to the approaches taken by many states 112 and the
federal government through sentencing tools such as the revisory
power and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. I 13
Retribution, often called 'Just deserts" when advocated by those to
the left of political center, is based upon the principles of justiceY4
That is, each crime deserves a certain sentence or range of sentences
that is commensurate with the harm done and the moral blameworthiness of the wrongdoer. 115 A sentence that is substantially harsher
than that which reflects the seriousness of the crime committed is un106. Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided Discretion in the Supreme
Courts Capital Sentencing jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1151, 1154
(2003).
107. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENT 45
(1976). See C. L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL
INTRODUCTION 7-8 (1987).
108. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 11 (1968).

109. See id.
110. JEFFRIE G. MuRPHY, RETRIBUTION RECONSIDERED 21 (1992). SeePacker, supra
note 108, at 9-10. See generally J.D. Mabbott, Punishment as a Corollary of RuleBreaking, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS, AND JUSTIFICATIONS 41 (RudolphJ. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds., 1972).
111. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY LAw 229 (1979); see PACKER, supra note 108, at 37. One commentator
observed, "[c]onsiderations of justice function as checks on social utility,
weighing against promoting happiness if in so doing some people must be
treated unfairly in the process.' MuRPHY, supra, at 150.
112. See Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative justice in the
United States, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 413,433 (2002)_
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)(2} (A) (2000).
114. See MURPHY, supra note 110, at 21-23; see also Erik Luna, The Theory and

jurisprudence of Restorative justice: Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural
Conception of Restorative justice, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 205, 255 (2002).
115. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 31 (1985).
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just and therefore immoral. 116 A punishment that is too light fails to
address the wrong done, diminishes the gravity of the crime committed,117 and ultimately erodes the moral compact of a free society.
Retribution is non-utilitarian in that its purpose is to further justice,
rather than to achieve a socially useful goal. lIB The utilitarian aspect
of retribution occurs only in the broadest sense of its purpose. 119 Retributionists believe that when a crime is committed, a wound is inflicted on society.120 The only way to salve that wound is to apprehend
the criminal and sentence him proportionally to the wrong he committed. 121 But retributionists, unlike utilitarians, do not focus on
whether the sentence will diminish the likelihood that the offender,
or a similarly situated person, will harm society again. 122 If a sentence
is proportional to the seriousness of the crime, justice is served and
the retributionist is satisfied. 123
Eighteenth-century criminologist Cesare Beccaria was perhaps the
most influential advocate of justice-based punishments. 124 In his
landmark work, On Crimes and Punishments,125 Beccaria argued that
punishments should not be based on who the offender was and his
status in society, but rather on the particular crime that was committed. 126 Beccaria argued that people must be treated equally by the
criminal justice system, regardless of their status or background. 127
116. Id. at 36. See HJ. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, in
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 119, 121-22 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972).
117. TEN, supra note 107, at 159.
118. MURPHY, supra note 110, at 21.
119. See id.
120. See TEN, supra note 107, at 52-53.
121. MuRPHY, supra note 1l0, at 23.
122. See generally id. at 21. Immanuel Kant expressed the retributionists' view by
stating that:
Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society,
but instead it must in all cases be imposed on him only on the
ground that he has committed a crime; for a human being can
never be manipulated merely as a means to the purposes of someone else and can never be confused with the objects of the Law of
things.
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 100 (John Ladd ed. & trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co.

1965) (1797).
123. TEN, supra note 107, at 154. C.S. Lewis argued that "the concept of Desert
is the only connecting link between punishment and justice." C.S. Lewis,
The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT,
supra note 110, at 195.
124. Cesare Beccaria, at http://www.criminology.fsu.edu/ crimtheory/beccaria.
htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
125. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans.,
Prentice Hall 1963) (1764).
126. Id. at 70.
127. Id.

2003]

Judicial Modification of Sentences in Maryland

17

Fairness and justice had to be the hallmarks of the legal system, and
this was to be achieved by focusing on the seriousness of the crime
and not the social status of the offender. 128 Part of Beccaria's approach to crime was the belief that crime was an act of freewill. 129
While certain factors increase the likelihood that some people will
commit crime, the most important consideration is an individual's
freewill and ability to act with his own volition. 130 As the decision to
commit a crime is a volitional and immoral one, punishment should
be based on the degree of moral wrong as well as the seriousness of
the criminal act itself. 131
Thus, Beccaria's belief in crime as an act of freewill and moral
wrong,' combined with his view that punishments should be fair for
the offender as well as society, led him to be an advocate for retribution. 132 Beccaria, however, also saw deterrence as a more utilitarian
goal that could be achieved without excessively skewing the necessary
proportional relationship between the seriousness of the crime and
the harshness of the punishment. 133
There are two types of deterrence that can be used in sentencing:
special (also referred to as specific) deterrence 134 and general deterrence. 135 Special deterrence seeks to make the price that the defendant will pay in either a fine or imprisonment high enough that he
will be disinclined to engage in criminal activity again.136 General deterrence makes a particular defendant's sentence a tool for modifYing
the behavior of others who might be contemplating committing a similar crime. 137 The result is that potential offenders will hear of the
128. See id.
129. Id. See also LEON RAnZINOWlCZ, IDEOLOGY AND CRIME 12-13 (1966) (discussing how this view of crime as the product of freewill makes both retribution
and deterrence appropriate justifications for punishment).
130. BECCARIA, supra note 125, at 12-13.
131. One commentator describes the retributionist's approach that views the
criminal as a rational actor as: "If he chooses not to sacrifice by exercising
self-restraint and obedience, this is tantamount to his choosing to sacrifice
in another way-namely, by paying the prescribed penalty." MuRPHY, supra
note 1l0, at 47. The criminal is morally responsible for his actions, which,
to the retributionist,justifies infliction of punishment. TEN, supra note 107,
at 46.
132. J.M. Burns & J.S. Mattina, Sentencing, in NICHOLAS N. KITI'RIE & ELYCE H.
ZEN OFF, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING, AND CORRECTIONS: LAw, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 8 (1981); see supra notes II 0-123 (discussing retributionist theories).
133. BECCARIA, supra note 125, at 62-63; see also supra notes 107-109 (discussing
utilitarian theory).
134. J.M. Burns &J.S. Mattina, Sentencing, inKlTI'RIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at
12; see also PACKER, supra note 108, at 45.
135. J.M. Burns &J.S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITI'RIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at
12.
136. Id.; PACKER, supra note 108, at 45.
137. J.M. Burns &J.S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITI'RIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at
12; see PACKER, supra note 108, at 39; see also Stanley I. Benn & Richard S.
Peters, The Utilitarian Case for Deterrence, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT,
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defendant's sentence and will decide that their own possible criminal
behavior is not worth the punishment, because the price of the penalty is higher than the rewards that flow from the criminal conduct. 138
Deterrence-based punishments involve one and possibly two necessary elements (depending on whether special or general deterrence is
the goal), the first somewhat theoretical, the second very practical. 139
Deterrence theory is based upon the view of crime as a rational act
and is in line with the work of Beccaria. 140 Beccaria, unlike the positivists that would follow him, believed that crime was an act of freewill. 141 He saw crime as the product of the criminal's rational decision
that the rewards from the crime exceeded the likelihood of being apprehended and successfully prosecuted combined with the severity of
the possible punishment. 142 Beccaria and his followers believed that
successful crime control would be achieved by tilting the balance just
enough so that the criminal viewed the cost of being caught and punished as greater than the bounty from the crime itself. 143 With respect
to specific deterrence, the judge should set the punishment just high
enough to create a significant disincentive for future criminal behavior by the defendant himself.144 Regarding general deterrence, the
defendant's punishment should be set high enough so others contemplating the commission of a similar crime will be frightened by the
penalty imposed.1 45
The second element-communication-is necessary only to
achieve the goals of general (not specific) deterrence. 146 In order for
others who are thinking of engaging in criminal activity similar to that
of the defendant to be deterred from doing so, the potential offender
must be aware of what sentence was handed out in a particular case. 147
Sometimes a case of particular notoriety achieves this goal because it

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

146.
147.

supra note 110, at 96-97; see also United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192,
202 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing Jeremy Bentham's espousal of general
deterrence) .
See BECCARIA, supra note 125, at 62-63; PACKER, supra note 108, at 140; VON
HIRSCH, supra note 115, at 31-32.
See Course Work, Does Deterrence Work, at http://www.courseworkbank.com.
uk/coursework/does_deterrence_work_2020/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
See J.M. Burns & J.S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITTRlE & ZENOFF, supra note
132, at 8.
See J.M. Burns & J.S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITTRIE & ZENOFF, supra note
132, at 8, 10.
See RAOZINOWICZ, supra note 129, at 12.
BECCARIA, supra note 125, at 62-63; Johannes Andenaes, General Prevention: A
Broader View of Deterrence, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT, supra note 110, at
109, 115-16.
See generally BECCARlA, supra note 125, at 42-43; J.M. Burns & J.S. Mattina,
Sentencing, in KITTRIE & ZEN OFF, supra note 132, at 12.
See PACKER, supra note 108, at 140; RADZINOWICZ, supra note 129, at 10-11;
VON HIRSCH, supra note 115, at 32.
J.M. Burns & J.S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITTRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at
13.
Andenaes, supra note 143, at 108-109.

2003]

Judicial Modification of Sentences in Maryland

19

receives saturation coverage in the media. Other times, proponents
of general deterrence hope to get the message out by repeatedly assigning appropriate sentences in cases involving certain crimes. 148
For example, society has come to view driving under the influence of
alcohol or drugs far more seriously than in past decades. While no
one sentence may convey the seriousness with which society now views
the dangers of this crime, proponents of general deterrence expect
that when the public repeatedly hears that offenders were given tough
sentences, others thinking of drinking and driving will not do so out
of fear of the legal consequences. 149
In the late-nineteenth century, positivists dominated criminal justice theory.150 Viewing Enrico Ferri as their intellectual father, the
positivists were a broadly grouped combination of criminologists and
others. 151 They believed that the decision to engage in criminal activity was far more than an act of freewill on the part of the offender. 152
Economic, social, environmental, psychological, anatomical and other
factors particular to the individual criminal were believed to also play
a role in the decision to violate the criminal laws. 153 The positivists
thought ignoring these factors when sentencing, was to ignore reality.154 The positivists focused not on the crime, but on the criminal
himself.155
This focus resonated from the idea that people commit crimes for
different reasons, often not of their own making. Therefore, it is both
wrong and ineffective to give everyone who commits the same offense
a similar sentence. 156 Positivists thought it better to tailor the sentence to fit the offender, which achieves specific goals through the
sentence. 157 These goals have been refined to incapacitation and
rehabilitation. 158
Incapacitation is a theory of punishment whose goal is to separate
offenders from society long enough so that they cannot offend again,
in order to protect society.159 Generally, sentences based primarily on
148. ].M. Burns &].S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KnTRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at
12-13.
149. See generally id. at 12.
150. See id. at 10; see also U.S. v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192,200 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); K
Lee Boyd, Are Human Rights Political Questions?, 53 RUTGERS L. REv. 277, 312
n.176 (2001).
151. ].M. Burns &].S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KrrTRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at
10-11.
152. Id. at 10-11.
153. Id. at 11.
154. See generally id.
155. See id. at 11, 23.
156. Id. at 23; see generally KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT, at iii
(Viking Compass ed., 1969).
157. See ].M. Burns & ].S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KrrTRIE & ZENOFF, supra note
132, at 11.
158. Id.
159. TEN, supra note 107, at 8.
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incapacitation are reserved for the most dangerous of criminals, those
who exhibit predatory and extremely violent behavior. 160 While incapacitationists consider the crime committed, they are far more concerned with the criminal and the likelihood of his committing
another serious offense. 161 Incapacitation, perhaps more than any
other theory of punishment, requires the sentencer to predict the future behavior of the defendant. 162 This is normally done by looking at
a variety of factors. These include the seriousness of the crime, how
often in the past the defendant has committed similar crimes, psychological or other profiles of the offender that offer reasons for his extreme, irrational behavior, and any other clues that might exist
regarding the offender's future dangerous conduct. 163 Often, these
factors deprive the offender of the ability to desist from the serious
and violent criminal behavior he previously exhibited.
There are many who commit criminal acts who do not need to be
separated from society for extended periods of time either because
they are not that dangerous to begin with or because the reasons behind their offenses can be removed or submerged. In one way or another, these individuals can be rehabilitated to the point where they
will no longer commit criminal acts. Therefore, sentences of incarceration should be only as long as it takes for the individual to be rehabilitated from those elements that caused him to commit the crime. 164
Rehabilitationists believe that the vast majority of criminals commit
crimes because of something in their psychological make-up, background, or environment that leads them to offend. 165
Based in positivist theory, rehabilitationists generally view it as
wrong to punish based primarily on the act committed and to sentence all similar actors to similar sentences. 166 Some rehabilitationists
see crime as a form of sickness or the result of other sicknesses. 167 As
with recovery from any disease, different people take different periods
of time to overcome those things that caused them to offend. 168 If the
160. ].M. Burns &].S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITrRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at
13.
161. Id.
162. VON HIRSCH, supra note 115, at 104; see also ].M. Burns & ].S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITrRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at 24.
163. VON HIRSCH, supra note 115, at 105; VON HIRSCH, supra note 107, at 87-88.
164. ].M. Burns & ].S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITrRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at
11,23.
165. Matthew A. Pauley, The jurisprudence of Crime and Punishment from Plato to
Hege~ 39 AM.]. JURIS. 97, 98-99, 108 (1994).
166. ].M. Burns &].S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITrRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at
11,23.
167. Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and judicial Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 2063, 2077 (2002); see generally MENNINGER, supra note 156
(discussing the notion of crime as a sickness).

168. ].M. Burns &].S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITTRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at
23.
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defendant is a substance abuser, perhaps his involvement in a drug or
alcohol program would remove his need to commit crimes. If the
problem is psychological, then counseling may be needed to deal with
the source of the offender's criminal behavior. If the problem is environmental, then a more positive environment needs to be created for
the offender. Sometimes that means merely changing the people and
groups with whom he interacts by moving him to a different location.
The source of the criminal behavior could also be economic. Perhaps
a basic education or vocational training would eliminate the criminal's need to steal or burglarize because he would have a better
chance of finding a job. The proponents of rehabilitation theory believe that it is a combination of some or all of these conditions that
lead to the defendant's criminal behavior. 169
Whatever the cause of the behavior, however, rehabilitationists
place their focus not on the offense committed as much as on what is
needed to treat the offender and make it less likely that he will offend
again. 170 Because every individual progresses at a different pace toward recovery, rehabilitationists find it illogical to set all sentences for
a particular crime at the same or similar levels of punishment. Additionally, these individual differences make it impossible to gauge at
the time of sentencing just how long it will take each offender to
achieve the goals of rehabilitation.
Most judges, if asked, will say they use a combination of the above
theories or utilize different theories in different cases. 171 Although
this may be true, such a claim should not be allowed to blur the difference in a sentence depending on the predominant theory used by the
judge in a particular case.
One example would be when a man finds his spouse in bed with
another man grabs a shotgun and shoots the spouse to death. This
man has no criminal record and no history of such behavior. A judge
placing greatest emphasis on incapacitation might say that this man is
unlikely to pose a danger to the community and, therefore, sentence
him to relatively little time in jail. Similarly, the rehabilitationist
might not sentence the defendant to a prison term because the defendant only needs to work on anger management in extreme situations.
Proponents of deterrence may regard the defendant's remorse and
history as signs that he does not need a long prison sentence to be
persuaded not to commit such an act again. Additionally, general deterrence based sentencers might focus on how much the shooting was
169. Adam Lamparello, Reaching Across Legal Boundaries: How Mediation Can Help
the Criminal Law in Adjudicating "Crimes Addition, " 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
REsoL. 335, 360 (2001).
170. See Craig Peyton Gaumer, Punishment for Prejudice: A Commentary on the Constitutionality and Utility of State Statutvry Responses to the Problem of Hate Crimes,
39 S.D. L. REv. 1,42 & n.239 (1994).
171. See infra Part VI.B. 7-8.
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purely reactive versus how much it was planned. If the latter, the
crime is more suited to a deterrence-based sentence. The more
thought that goes into a criminal act the more likely it is that the
offender can be persuaded not to commit such an act in the future by
making the penalty for the .current crime very harsh. Advocates of
general deterrence will sentence the defendant according to how
strongly they believe the message must unequivocally resonate that
such shootings will not be excused or minimized because of the circumstances involved.
Retributionist sentencers may impose a much different sentence
than the utilitarian-based sentencers discussed above. A judge with
retributionist views might consider some of the factors used by other
groups, including incapacitation, rehabilitation and deterrence, but
ultimately he would likely still punish the defendant severely for the
crime committed. This is because a judge relying primarily on retribution theory would not wish to deprecate the seriousness of taking a
human life and, therefore, impose a heavy sentence on the defendant.
Often, a sentence based in retribution theory is harsher than one
that looks for guidance to the utilitarian theories, but also the opposite is true on many occasions. 172 One case that reached the Supreme
Court that involved such a sentence was Hutto v. Davis. 173 The case
involved Roger Davis, who was convicted in Virginia of the crimes of
possession and possession with intent to distribute nine ounces of marijuana. 174 He was originally sentenced, by a jury and approved by the
trial judge, to twenty years in prison on each charge, which ran consecutively.175 In other words, Davis got forty years in prison for offenses involving nine ounces of marijuana. 176 This sentence was
thirteen times longer than the average for defendants in Virginia who
were convicted of similar offenses at the time. 177 When Davis was sentenced, the jury took into consideration a number of personal factors
of the defendant. 178 The jury concluded Davis was a poor candidate
for rehabilitation and determined that he needed to be deterred by a
long sentence or incapacitated, lest he do other anti-social things. 179
A retribution-based sentence would require a relationship between
the seriousness of the crime and the length of prison time given the
172. See Paul Butler, By Any M~ans Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion to
Change Unjust Law, 50 VClA L. REv. 721, 757 n.159 (2003).
173. Hutto v. Davis, 454 V.S. 370 (1982).
174. [d. at 370.
175. [d. at 371.
176. [d.
177. Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444, 453 (W.D. Va. 1977).
178. See Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226, 1228 (4th Cir. 1978).
179. See Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme
Court's Tortured Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 Ky. LJ. 107,
120-21 nn.80, 87, 88 (1996).
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defendant. Such a requirement would surely rule out a sentence of
forty years for the crimes of which Davis was convicted.
Although the length of sentences can vary greatly depending on the
predominant theory of punishment used by the sen tencer, so too can
the entire structure of a sentencing system turn on which punishment
theories have the greatest influence on the criminal justice system.
During the middle of the twentieth century, the utilitarian theories of
punishment were used in most, if not all, American penal systems. lSO
One result of this focus, particularly on rehabilitation and incapacitation, was the common use of the indeterminate prison sentence. lSI
The distinguishing feature of the indeterminate sentence is that at
the time the judge issues the sentence, it is largely uncertain just how
much time the defendant will actually be incarcerated. Is2 By contrast,
a completely fixed sentence sets the duration of prison time at the
instance the sentence is issued. The indeterminate sentence is consistent with the rehabilitation and incapacitation models of punishment
because each of those theories looks primarily to the offender rather
than the offense committed. Is3 Indeterminate sentences condition
the length of incarceration on the amount of time the defendant
needs to be separated from society so he no longer poses a serious
danger or the time it will take him to become rehabilitated. I84 As the
length of time it takes to achieve these results varies with the individual offender, it is very difficult for the judge at the time of sentencing
to determine how long a period of time the defendant needs to be
incarcerated to achieve the desired results. Therefore, for a judge
whose primary sentencing goals are either incapacitation or rehabilitation, it is better to wait and see how the individual defendant is progressing before deciding when he should be released. ls5
While in theory sentences can be completely fixed (ten years in
prison) or completely indeterminate (a period of time from one day
to life to be decided later by the appropriate authorities), they are
almost always neither completely fixed nor entirely indeterminate.
During the mid-twentieth century, sentences were far more indeterminate and the range of minimum and maximum sentences far greater
than they are today.lS6 In California, for example, most of those con180. See generally Symposium, The Warren Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and Retributive Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1411, 1422-23 (2002).
181. [d.
182. See Wendy Keller, Disparate Treatment of Spouse Murder Defendants, 6 S. CAL. L.
REv. & WOMEN'S STUD. 255, 279 (1996).
183. Symposium, The Model Penal Code and Three Two (Possibly Only One) Ways
Courts Avoid Mens Rea, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 139, 178-79 (2000).
184. See Barry C. Field, Race, Politics, & Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the
Conservative "Backlash,» 87 MINN. L. REv. 1447, 1504-05 (2003).
185. See infra Part VI.D.
186. See Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How
Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing,
40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 87, 89-90 (2003).

24

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 33

victed of a felony were sentenced from a one-year incarceration to a
period of time to be determined by the parole authority.187 Maryland
sentenced some offenders to the Patuxent Institution where their release date was determined primarily by how well they were rehabilitated while in the Institution. 188 Even in more standard systems of
punishment, it was common to have sentences whose possible statutory ranges were wide (Le., no minimum and twenty-five years maxi187. See, e.g., In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1, 3-4 (1976). The defendant in In re Grant
was convicted for the sale of marijuana and sentenced to state prison for
ten years to life without the possibility of parole before ten years because of
his prior narcotics conviction. Id. The defendant sought a writ of habeas
corpus stating that his minimum period for parole eligibility constituted
cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 4-5. The Supreme Court of California directed the Adult Authority as follows:
"[T]o grant parole consideration to [the defendant] ... without
regard to the provisions of [the] former [statute]," because it constituted both cruel and unusual punishment, based on its overbreadth in absolutely prohibiting parole for substantial periods of
time without regard to the gravity of the particular offense, the nature of the offender, or the existence of possible mitigating
circumstances.
Id. at 16-18; see also In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d. 410, 413-14 (1972). The defendant inmate in In re Lynch applied for writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme
Court of California contending that the indeterminate sentence, which was
imposed by the California trial court as the aggravated penalty for secondoffense indecent exposure, was cruel and unusual punishment. Id. Under
the recidivist provision of section 314 [of the California Penal Code], defendant had been sentenced to prison for an indeterminate term, with a
maximum life sentence. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 314 (West 1999). The Supreme Court of California granted the writ and ordered the defendant discharged from custody, and held that the particular indeterminate sentence,
imposed pursuant to section 314, was unconstitutional because of the unreasonably high maximum term. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d. at 438-39; CAL. PENAL CODE § 314. The Court held that "when a defendant under an
indeterminate sentence challenges that sentence as cruel or unusual punishment ... the test is whether the maximum term of imprisonment permitted by the statute punishing his offense exceeds the constitutional limit,
regardless of whether a lesser term may be fixed in his particular case." In
re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d. at 419.
188. See, e.g., Dir. of Patuxent Inst. v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397 (1966).
In Dir. of Patuxent Inst., the Court of Appeals of Maryland found that the
defendant had to be released from the Patuxent Institution because the
defendant had been referred to the Institution for a diagnosis of possible
defective delinquency. Id. at 24, 221 A.2d at 402. The court held that a
person cannot be referred to the Institution until one or more of the five
prerequisites of conviction for a specified crime existed. Id. The Maryland
Defective Delinquent Act was established to protect society from persons
who show a "propensity toward criminal activity." Id. at 32, 221 A.2d at 406.
The Institution focuses on confinement and treatment in the means of rehabilitation, rather than punishment and deterrence. See id. The court in
this case, however, found that the defendant had none of the prerequisites
when he was referred and the county that referred the defendant erred in
doing so because only the sentencing court could refer the defendant. Id.
at 24, 221 A.2d at 402.
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mum) and judges who frequently sentenced defendants to prison
terms with wide ranges (i.e., five to fifteen years).189
Attacks on the indeterminate sentencing system from both the
left l90 and the right in the later half of the twentieth century resulted
in far more determinate sentences. 191 The ranges of sentences were
markedly reduced l92 and the focus of sentencing was on the crime
more than the criminal. 193 Rehabilitation became a secondary concern in many punishment systems or even a non-existent one in
some. 194 Foremost among these systems was the one adopted by the
federal government. 195
In 1984, Congress approved the formation of a new and radically
different sentencing system than had been used previously.196 A point
189. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1938,1941-42 (1988).
190. The left argued that they were unfair, discriminatory, and rewarded conformity in the institution rather than true rehabilitation. JESSICA MITFORD,
KIND AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 91-92 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1973). Ms.
Mitford launches a withering attack on California's system of indeterminate
punishments and the many unjust results it produces. See id. See also Kate
Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of
the Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223, 227 (1993).
191. The right argued that they resulted in the release of dangerous criminals
too early, rewarded inmates who were good at playing the game, led to too
much sentencing disparity among those who committed the same crime,
and focused too much on rehabilitating the criminal without sufficient concern for the harm to the victim and the seriousness of the crime. Stith &
Koh, supra note 190, at 228; see also Jonathan D. Casper, Determinate Sentencing and Prison Crowding in Illinois, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 231, at 234-35 (1984).
192. See Weinstein, supra note 186, at 91-92 (regarding federal sentencing guidelines); see also Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other
States, and the Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. SENT. R. 69,
Part ILA-B. (1999).
193. See Stith & Koh, supra note 190, at 284 (explaining that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines "view the relevancy of personal characteristics with
skepticism") .
194. See Ogletree, supra note 189, at 1953. Rehabilitation was one of the factors
Congress instructed the Sentencing Commission to consider, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2000), but as Charles Ogletree notes, the Commission decided
to consider rehabilitation and personal factors only in determining
whether a sentence fits within the guidelines. Id. In his view, "[a] system
that fails to consider the offender's personal characteristics places too great
an emphasis on the harm caused by the offender's act and too little emphasis on circumstances that would serve to mitigate the punishment." Id. at
1953-54.
195. Although rehabilitation was one of the stated goals of the federal sentencing system, the Guidelines "failed to achieve a proper balance of the four
theories of punishment, favoring retribution and general deterrence, and
relegating rehabilitative efforts to those convicted of only the least severe
crimes." Karin Bornstein, 5K2. 0 Departures for 5H Individual Characteristics: A
Backdoor Out of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv.
135,160 (1992).
196. Orrin A. Hatch, The Rnle of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing
Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and
Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 185, 187-88 (1993).
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system was established that placed greatest emphasis on the crime
committed and only looked to a small number of personal factors of
the criminal, most of which were fairly objective in nature. 197 The
systemic goal was to reduce almost entirely disparities in sentencing,
thus ensuring that those who committed similar crimes received similar sentences. 19B Judges were given far less sentencing discretion both
as to the range of their sentences and what factors they could use to
govern their sentencing determinations. 199 While most states have
not adopted stringent mandatory guidelines like those adopted by the
federal government, many states have substantially changed their sentencing systems to limit the range of sentences and reduce their
indeterminacy.200
Maryland, in limiting its range of sentences, establishing certain
mandatory minimum sentences, adopting permissive sentencing
guidelines, and creating sentencing review panels, has followed the
national trend away from indeterminacy in sentencing and toward
some limitation on judicial discretion. Unlike the federal government, however, Maryland still proclaims rehabilitation to be one of
the primary goals of sentencing. 201 Furthermore, the guidelines that
exist in the state are only advisory and are not followed by the judges
in about half the cases before them. 202
These differences in sentencing philosophy and structure are most
significant when it comes to assessing the appropriateness of sentencing revision. In the federal system in which parole has been abolished, where rehabilitation is not a primary goal of sentencing, and
curtailing disparity is a raison d'etre, to allow judges to revise sentences
would seem to be anathema. 203 Sentencing revision is done most
often to foster the goal of rehabilitation, and it can often result in
offenders who committed the same crime, receiving markedly differ197. Ogletree, supra note 189, at 1949-50; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
198. See Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerg;ing Departure
jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1,3-5 (1991); see also Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1,8-9 (1987); Ogletree, supra note 189, at 1938-39.
199. See Robinson, supra note 198, at 2-3; Ogletree, supra note 189, at 1947, 1953.
200. Kevin R. Reitz, ALI, Modern Penal Code: Sentencing, Plan for Revision, 6 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REv. 525, 557-58 (2002). At the end of the twentieth century, fifteen states were operating with sentencing guidelines and seven states had
"entered active study processes moving toward such a framework." Id.
201. State v. Dopkowski, 325 Md. 671, 679, 602 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1992) (citing
Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 540, 336 A.2d 113, 115 (1975».
202. MD. STATE COMM'N ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING POLICY, ANNUAL REpORT 4
(2002), available at http://www.msccsp.org/publications/ar2002.pdf. After
falling below fifty percent in 1999 and 2000, the rate of judicial compliance
with the guidelines rose to 50.9% in 2001. Id. at 7.
203. See Joseph S. Hall, Guided to Injustice?: The Effect of the Sentencing Guidelines on
Indigent Defendants and Public Defense, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1331, 1342
(1999).
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ent sentences. 204 But in a sentencing scheme like Maryland's, allowing judges to adjust sentences after seeing how the offender is
progressing in his efforts to deal with the problems that led him to
offend, can greatly further the goal of rehabilitation.

V.

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST REVISORY POWER

The wisdom and fairness of giving judges the power to modify
sentences is the subject of much controversy among those involved in
the criminal justice system. The most vocal critics of judges' power to
reduce sentences have been prosecuting attorneys,205 victims' rights
activists 206 and some state legislators. 207 Some of the critics are completely opposed to the practice of judicial sentence modification,
while others would like to see a one-year time limit imposed, or the
practice restricted to only non-violent crimes. The strongest support204. See Reitz, supra note 200, at 528.
205. See Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra note 5. The bill
to place a time limit on judges' revisory power was supported by the States'
Attorneys Association and by many individual state's attorneys. See id.
Montgomery County State's Attorney Douglas Cansler stated, "[t]he whole
concept of reconsideration is institutionalized hoodwinking of the public
.... " [d. Chief Felony Prosecutor for Prince George's County, Robert L.
Dean, stated that" [reconsideration is] kind of the dirty little secret of the
criminal justice system." Id. Although most prosecutors oppose the practice of sentence revision and would like to see it abolished or limited, our
survey found that judges reported that a majority of motions for sentence
reduction were not opposed by the prosecution. See infra Part VI.B.5.
206. See, e.g., Christian Davenport & Maureen O'Hagan, Prosecutors Back Limits on
Sentence Reductions, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2001, at T3. Sheri DePetro, Executive Director of the STTAR center (a Howard County nonprofit that serves
victims of sex crimes and child abuse) stated that giving judges the power to
"reduce [offenders'] sentences makes a mockery of our criminal justice systern .... " [d. See also Katherine Shaver & Christian Davenport, Second Looks
at Sentencing; Duncan, Gansler Support Limits, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2001, at
T3. Michaele Cohen, Executive Director of the Maryland Network Against
Domestic Violence stated that "she wants to ensure that victims are notified
when a judge is asked to reduce their attacker's sentence." [d. See also
Roberta Roper, Editorial, Del. Vallario: For Victim s Rights, WASH. POST, Feb.
17,2001, at A30. Roberta Roper formed the Stephanie Roper Committee
with the goal of changing the laws that address victims rights. See also
STANDING COMM. ON R. OF PRAGTICE & PROC., MINUTES OF R. COMM., at 8-9
(Mar. 9, 2001), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/rules/3-9-Ol.pdf
[hereinafter STANDING COMM.]. Robert L. Dean, Esq., member of the
Criminal Subcommitee, stated that "[v]ictims of crime are upset when the
sentence of the defendant is reduced." [d. at 6.
207. See, e.g., LeDuc, supra note 9, at C5. Del. Anthony Brown, "prompted by his
outrage over ajudge reducing the sentence of [a double murderer]," sponsored legislation to limit a judge'S power to reconsider sentences. [d. See
also Lori Montgomery, Maryland House Rejects Limits on Judges: Delegates Approve Study of Resentencing After Panel's Unannounced Meeting, WASH. POST,
Mar. 22, 2001, at B2. "Sen. Christopher Van Hollen,Jr. (D) vowed to press
ahead with a Senate bill to set a one-year limit on reconsiderations .... " [d.
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ers of the practice are various state judges,208 along with the criminal
defense bar209 and their supporters in the legislature. 210 Many judges
oppose any limitation on their revisory power, although some judges
are not opposed to a time limitation. They believe, however, it should
be two or three years, rather than the one-year limit proposed in the
state bill. 211
The argument most frequently advanced by opponents of sentence
modification is that the convicted criminal is getting a benefit he or
she does not deserve. 212 After receiving all the protections of due process and being sentenced by a judge considering all relevant matters,
the right to sentence revision offers the defendant a second chance to
obtain a favorable sentence. 213 Allowing the convicted criminal this
second chance takes away from the finality of the process 214 and de-

208. See, e.g., Daniel LeDuc, Townsend Invigorates Battle Over Judges' Sentencing
Power; Lt. Governor Backs Measure to Limit Ability to Reduce Terms, WASH. POST,
Feb. 6, 2002, at B2. The Maryland Conference of Circuit Judges voted
unanimously in 2002 to oppose the bills to limit the judges' revisory power.
Id. See also Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra note 5.
ChiefJudge Robert M. Bell of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, stated that
Marylandjudges "generally oppose [proposals to limit discretion]." Id. Numerous state judges have spoken out against limiting the judges power. Id.
A few judges, however, have supported the one-year limitation. See also LeDuc, supra note 9. Retired Court of Appeals Judge John F. McAuliffe, a
member of the Rules Committee, favors a one-year limit while acknowledging that the majority of judges favor "the status quo." Id.
209. See, e.g., Manuel Roig-Franzia & Matthew Mosk, Resentencing Debated in Legal
Community, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2001, at T3. Criminal Defense Attorney T.
Joseph Touhey stated, "it would be a mistake to impose strict sentencing
guidelines, such as those employed in federal criminal cases." Id. See also
Davenport & O'Hagan, supra note 206. Carol Hanson, Director of the
Howard County Public Defender's Office, believes a judge's reconsideration power does have benefits, "especially when a drug offender has been
rehabilitated." See id.
210. See, e.g., Lori Montgomery, Miller Kills Bill to Curb Judges' Power, WASH. POST,
Mar. 28, 2002, at B1. "Senate President Mike V. Miller Jr. killed a bill that
would have limited the power of Maryland judges to lower criminal
sentences." Id. Del. Joseph F. VallarioJr., Chairman of the HouseJudiciary
Committee, "has opposed efforts to restrict the use of sentencing reconsideration." See Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra note 5.
211. See, e.g., STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at 12-13. Judge Ellen Heller
stated, "[i]f there is a two- or three-year period for these individuals to satisfy their probation and get out of the system, they may be able to stay off
drugs and became [sic] productive citizens." Id.
212. See generally Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra note 5.
213. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-102 (2001). It could be argued that this is
a third chance in that any person sentenced to more than two years imprisonment has a right to have the sentence reviewed by a threejudge panel.
Id.
214. See LeDuc, supra note 208. "Citizens need to have confidence that a sentence really has meaning and finality." Id.
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prives victims of the closure to which they are entitled. 215 Additionally, by sentencing defendants to a term of imprisonment and then
later modifying the sentence to allow them their freedom earlier, the
criminal justice system takes away from the notion of truth in sentencing. 216 Thus, the possibility of sentence modification well into the defendant's serving of his sentence is said to erode confidence in a
system that seems always to be struggling to maintain even the barest
level of public confidence. 217
While the power to revise sentences does take away from the finality
of the original sentence, such finality would not be present in any
event because of the possibility of pardon or executive clemency.
Most prominent in creating this uncertainty as to how much time a
defendant will ultimately serve is the possibility of parole.
Incarcerated defendants in Maryland have the possibility of obtaining parole after serving one-quarter of their original sentences,218
or in cases of "violent crimes,"219 one-half of their sentences. 220 The
members of the parole board, using statutory factors 221 and their own
personal assessments of each inmate, determine whether the defendant will be released the first time he is eligible for parole or at any of
several other junctures during his time in prison. 222 Victims are rarely
told of this possibility when the sentence is imposed, and even if they
are, the uncertainty is still present. 223 Therefore, if by finality for victims, it is meant that they will know at the time of sentencing how long
215. See generally LeDuc, supra note 20S. Senate Judicial Proceedings Chairman
Walter M. Baker stated that "[t]here should be some closure to the victims'
families." Id.
216. Id. Former Lieutenant Governor Kathleen Kennedy Townsend testified at
a Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing that "[c]itizens raised concerns
about truth in sentencing .... We need to maintain public confidence in
our judiciary." Id.
217. See generally id. At a meeting of the Maryland Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, member Roger Titus stated to the Committee that he
was "troubled by the public's lack of confidence in the courts." STANDING
COMM., supra note 206, at IS. "The whole concept of reconsideration is
institutionalized hoodwinking of the public, the press and victims of crime
. . .. This is the type of procedure that breeds cynicism among the public
in the justice system." Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality,
supra note 5, at Al (interviewing Montgomery County State's Attorney
Douglas Gansler).
21S. Mo. CODE ANN., CaRR. SERVo § 7-301 (a)(l)(ii) (1999).
219. Mo. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw, § 7-101(m) (2002 & Supp. 2003). For the purposes of the parole statute, "violent crimes" are defined as those in section
14-lO1 of the Criminal Law Subject section of the Maryland Annotated
Code and burglary in the first, second, or third degree. Id.; see also MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 14-101 (a) (2002).
220. Mo. CODE ANN., CaRR. SERVo § 7-301 (c).
221. Id. § 7-301 (defining at what time an inmate is eligible for parole).
222. See infra Part VI.B.S (describing factors considered when determining
whether the defendant will be eligible for parole).
223. See generally Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra note 5.
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the defendant will be incarcerated, such finality will not be achieved
with or without sentence revision.
Until 2001, the Maryland Rules did not require that victims be notified when an inmate had an approaching modification hearing, which
often closed the door to having the victim's views expressed through
the prosecution. 224 Wisely, the Rules were amended to require that
victims be notified when a hearing will be held on the defendant's
request to have his sentence reduced. 225
In order to foster public confidence in the system,226 and to make
the process "more open,"227 the Rule was amended to require judges
making sentence modifications to do so "only on the record in open
court, after hearing from the defendant, the State, and from each victim or victim's representative who requests an opportunity to be
heard."228 The judge is also required to "file or dictate into the record a statement setting forth the reasons on which the ruling is
based."229
Critics of sentencing modification argue that the power to alter the
sentence once it has been imposed by the judge, and held valid by an
appellate court, resides with the executive branch of the government. 230 The traditional methods for sentence modification-parole,
224. Compare MD. R. 4-345 (2001) with MD. R. 4-345 (2003).
225. MD. R. 4-345(c) (2003). The Rule was amended, effective January 1, 2002,
to require that the State's Attorney give notice to victims or their representatives of the filing of or hearings on a motion to modify sentence. Id. It
also gives them the right to testify at any such hearing. Id. Rule 4-435(c)
reads:
Notice to Victims. The State's Attorney shall give notice to each
victim and victim's representative who has filed a Crime Victim Notification Request form pursuant to Code, Criminal Procedure Article, § 11-104 or who has submitted a written request to the State's
Attorney to be notified of subsequent proceedings as provided
under Code, Criminal Procedure Article, § 11-503 that states (1)
that a motion to modify or reduce a sentence has been filed; (2)
that the motion has been denied without a hearing or the date,
time, and location of the hearing; and (3) if a hearing is to be held,
that each victim or victim's representative may attend and testify.
Id. Of course, this raises a different problem-that participation in the
hearing will be emotionally difficult for the victim or victim's family. One
family member of a victim, following a hearing on the killer's request for
sentence modification, stated: "Mter it's all supposed to be over, you're getting slapped again .... It's torture to put people through that." Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra note 5.
226. See STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at 11-12, lB.
227. See generally Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra note 5, at
AI.
228. MD. R. 4-345(d).
229. Id.
230. See STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at B. Robert Dean, a Prince George's
County prosecutor and Rules Committee member, stated that "[t]he retention of control by a judge over the sentence blends the judicial function
into the executive function, and [it] is not healthy." Id.
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pardon and clemency-are all functions of the executive branch. 231
Parole, in part because of its applicability to almost all defendants, is
said to be the appropriate vehicle for taking into consideration the
kinds of factors that judges often use when modifying sentences. 232
Critics of sentencing modification question whether judges should
have the power to usurp parole boards, thereby, creating an added
mechanism by which defendants may have their sentences reduced. 233
Sentencing modification advocates respond to critics by providing
evidence that parole is an ineffective and inadequate means of determining which inmates should be released early and how soon into
their sentences this release should occur. 234 They cite evidence that
the parole system in Maryland is overwhelmed by as many as 22,000
cases a year. 235 The large number of cases makes it difficult for the
Parole Commission to give each case in-depth consideration. 236 Most
parole hearings are held by video conferencing, which results in
neither the hearing examiner nor the parole board ever meeting the
inmate. 237
Some people feel that the parole system is too sensitive to political
pressures. 238 Governors may not want to release even deserving inmates for fear of being labeled "soft on crime," which would be a serious political liability.239 For example, former Governor Glendening
refused even to consider parole for any defendant given a life sentence. 240 It could be argued that the law, by distinguishing between
231. Id. "There are instances where sentences should be adjusted, but this
should be handled by the executive branch of government. Executive
power includes parole, clemency, and pardons." Id.
232. Compare supra Part VI.B.8 (identifying criteria that judges use in modifying
sentences), with MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERV., § 7-305 (1999) (identifying
factors and information to be considered during parole hearings).
233. See STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at 8. In an interview with the Washington Post, Anne Arundel County State's Attorney Frank Weathersbee
stated that 'Judges have been undercutting the authority of the parole
board." Roig-Franzia & Mosk, supra note 209, at T3.
234. See STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at 7-8 (statement of Committee Member Tim Maloney).
235. Id. at 7.
236. Id.
237. Id. Maryland Correctional Services Code section 7-304(e) "does not limit
the authority of the Commission to hold a parole hearing through the use
of a video conference or other means of electronic transmission." MD.
CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS., § 7-304(e). The Maryland Parole Commission
has chosen to conduct the majority of parole hearings this way. Interview
with Phillip Dantes, former Chairman, Maryland Parole Commission (May
15,2003).
238. Lester Welch, Editorial, Politics of Parole Boards, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2001,
at B6.
239. See Lori Montgomery, Lawmaker Seeks to Expand Judges' Power, WASH. POST,
Feb. 15, 2001, at B4.
240. Id. Persons given life sentences may be eligible for parole after either fifteen or twenty-five years, and such parole is contingent on "the approval of
the Governor." MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS, § 7-301 (d).
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life sentences with and without the possibility of parole, contemplates
that those sentenced to life with the possibility of parole would at least
have their cases reconsidered at some time. 241 The Honorable Joseph
Murphy, Chief Judge of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,
views this kind of situation as one argument for retaining a judge's
power to modifY: "People otherwise eligible for parole are suddenly
no longer eligible. . . . Well, a judge might want to make an adjustment for that."242
In part because of these reasons and in part beyond them, advocates of sentence revision maintain that judges are far better positioned to determine which convicted persons should have their
sentences modified and specifically what forms these modifications
should take. 243 In contrast to the parole board, judges see the defendants personally and often get to know them in a manner different
than that of the parole board. 244 As several judges indicated in the
Survey conducted in co~unction with this Article, judges are better
able to gauge and keep track of the progress, or lack thereof, that an
offender is making to deal with the root causes of his offense. 245 Additionally, judges have far better knowledge of the crime itself, including the degree of culpability of the defendant, the role of the victim,
the seriousness of any injury or loss, and the attitude of the defendant
at the time of the crime.
Nonetheless, due to the problems that critics see as arising from the
lack of finality created by sentence revision, some advocates want to
place a time limit on how long after imposition of the original sentence a modification request could be heard. Specifically, some Maryland state legislators and prosecutors have proposed a one-year
limitation. 246 Supporters of sentence revision respond to this by asserting that a one year, or any fixed time period, is often not long
enough to determine whether an offender has been rehabilitated and
241. See Montgomery, supra note 239, at B4. In Lomax v. Warden, an inmate serving a life sentence, and who had been recommended for parole by the
Commission, challenged Glendening's policy as an ex post facto law in violation of Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution and
Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 356 Md. 569, 572, 741
A.2d 476, 478 (1999). The court denied his challenge, holding that the
Governor's announcement of a policy on how he was likely to exercise discretion was not a "law" within the meaning of the constitutional prohibitions. Id. at 577, 741 A.2d at 481.
242. Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra note 5, at AI.
243. STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at 7-8.
244. Id.
245. See discussion infra Part VI.
246. See Montgomery, supra note 210, at B7. This was the proposed limitations
period in S.B. 73 and H.B. 61, which were rejected during the 2002 legislative session. Id. In an effort to gain support, the Senate bill was amended
to raise the period to fifteen months. Id. This bill was approved by the
Senate Judiciary Committee but withheld from a full Senate vote by Senate
President Mike Miller. Id.
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is deserving of sentence modification. 247 Individuals progress at different paces, depending, for example, on whether they are engaged
in educational, therapeutic, vocational or psychological programs. 248
No one fixed time period fits all. Additionally, some programs are not
available to offenders until they have served a certain amount of their
sentence and other programs may have a waitlist that extends beyond
a year or more. 249
Another systemic argument advanced by opponents of the sentencing revision power is that modifYing sentences creates disparity among
judges regarding the sentences of individuals who commit the same or
similar crimes. 25o It is the view of most observers of the criminal justice system that disparity in sentencing practices creates unfairness in
the system, which adds to the public perception of the entire criminal
justice system as being unfair. 251 This perception has real consequences when it comes to matters such as funding and the degree of
cooperation victims and witnesses are willing to provide in criminal
cases.
Judges in Maryland, as in most other states, have great discretion
within prescribed statutory limits regarding the sentence to be imposed. 252 To deal with the problem of sentencing disparity, Maryland
has guidelines that are intended to encourage judges to sentence in a
similar manner and that provide three judge panels to which the defendant can appeal his or her sentence. 253 These guidelines, however,
247. STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at 7 (describing statement of Committee
member Tim Malony).
248. [d. at 12-14 (describing a statement made by Judge Ellen M. Heller).
249. [d. at 11-13.
250. See id. at 8. Robert Dean, a member of the Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure, stated that "UJudges vary remarkably-some rule immediat~ly,; some hold the case for a long time. This scattered approach is chaotIc. [d.
251. See Montgomery & LeDuc, Loopholes, supra note 5, at AI.
252. State v. Dopowski, 325 Md. 671, 679, 602 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1992) ("At the
outset we note that a sentencing judge in a criminal proceeding is 'vested
with virtually boundless discretion.''') (quoting Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460,
480,425 A.2d 632,642 (1981». The judge's discretion is limited only in
those cases where a specific or minimum sentence is mandated by the criminal code. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 2-201 (2002) (regarding
murder in the first degree); see also id. § 4-204 (regarding the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime); id. § 14-101 (regarding mandatory
sentences for crimes of violence). For example, a person convicted of murder in the first degree must be sentenced either to death, imprisonment for
life without the possibility of parole, or imprisonment for life. [d. § 2201(b). Section 14-101 of the Maryland Code lists twenty-one "crimes of
violence" which carry a mandatory minimum sentence for a second or subsequent violation. [d. § 14-101 (a). Section 4-204 of the Maryland Code
mandates a minimum sentence of five years for use of a handgun in the
commission of a felony. [d. § 4-204.
253. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. hoc. § 6-208 (2001); see also id. § 8-102. The
Maryland Sentencing Commission "shall adopt sentencing guidelines that
the Commission may change." [d. § 6-208(a)(I). Any person sentenced to
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are permissive,254 and in fact, recent statistics reveal that Maryland
judges sentence outside the guidelines in approximately half of all
criminal convictions. 255 Whatever disparity that may occur as a result
of sentence modification exists in large part because of the sentencing
discretion afforded judges by law. 256 Sentencing revision may create
more disparity or conceivably less disparity-if the judge's original
sentence was on the harsh side-but the disparity is not created by the
right to revise sentences. The most that can be said in this regard is
that revision offers judges a chance to create disparity a second time.
The systemic arguments advanced by those opposed to sentence revision often embody the principles of the retributionist approach to
punishment discussed in Part N. Retribution is one of the justifications for punishment that has been approved in Maryland and elsewhere. A retributionist is concerned almost exclusively with the
sentencing result that the punishment fits the crime, a decision that
can be made at the time of the original sentence. 257
In Maryland, and virtually every other state, however, rehabilitation,
incapacitation and deterrence are also valid considerations that inform ajudge's sentence. 258 These three utilitarian punishmentjustifications may arguably be implemented better at a time beyond the
original imposition of sentence. 259 How rapidly has the offender's alcohol, drug or psychological counseling progressed in making him
less subject to the influences that were at the root of his criminal conduct? Has he or she made restitution, completed community service
or fulfilled other obligations imposed by the judge for the betterment

254,

255.
256.

257,

258.
259.

more than two years imprisonment' may have the sentence reviewed by a
threejudge panel. [d. § 8-102(a).
[d. § 6-211 (b). Regulations adopted by the Sentencing Commission "are
voluntary guidelines that a court need not follow." [d,
MD. STATE COMM'N ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING POLICY, supra note 202. In
1999, only 41.8% of sentences fell within the guidelines. [d. The number
increased to 48.8% in 2000 and 50.9% in 2001. [d.
See State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 80, 785 A.2d 1275, 1285-86 (2001). Prosecutors have exactly the same very limited right to appeal a sentence whether it
is an original sentence or a modified one. [d. In both cases, the state may
appeal only if the judge has failed to impose a statutorily mandatory sentence. [d.
VON HIRSCH, supra note 115, at 31, 64. Retribution, or just deserts, seeks to
punish an offender for the act committed commensurate with the harm
inflicted and the moral wrongfulness of the act. [d. at 31. Andrew von
Hirsch defines harm as "the injury done or risked by the criminal act." [d.
at 64. In assessing wrongfulness or culpability, he looks to "the factors of
intent, motive and circumstance." [d.
Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 265, 647 A.2d 1204, 1209 (1994); State v.
Dopkowski, 325 Md. 671, 679, 602 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1992); Johnson v.
State, 274 Md. 536, 540, 336 A.2d 113, 115 (1975).
Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra note 5. Chief Judge
Robert Bell of the Court of Appeals of Maryland opined that "[sentence
revision] is flexibility aimed at the rehabilitation of the person in front of
you ... , If your aim is retribution, this thing doesn't make sense," [d.
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of the victim or the offender? Does the offender still pose such a danger to the community that he needs to be separated from it? Has the
offender been punished enough so that he will regard the consequences of being apprehended and punished for criminal conduct as
outweighing the benefits of such conduct? Many judges and other
proponents of sentence revision believe that all of these questions are
best answered after observing the defendant for some time after his
sentence has begun and that the judge is best positioned to evaluate
them. 260
Inextricably linked to the positions expressed immediately above is
the belief that people looking forward to at least some possibility of
reward are more likely to change their behavior in order to achieve
that reward. 261 A prisoner who has an application for sentence reduction pending before ajudge has much more incentive to behave properly and work toward improvement than one who has no possibility of
release for many years. 262
Such incentives are regarded as having benefits within penal institutions as well. Offenders are said to be less likely to cause trouble
within custodial institutions if they know that by not engaging in such
conduct, they increase their chances for having their sentences reduced. 263 Motivational benefits deriving from an offender's awareness of the possibility of sentence modification occur in non-custodial
260. [d. "Maryland Judges want to retain flexibility with a goal toward rehabilitating defendants." [d. (inteIViewing Robert Bell, ChiefJudge of the Court
of Appeals of Maryland).
I think that it is often used in a rehabilitative approach that meets
with everybody's approval, including the prosecutor's .... Many,
for the first time in their lives, are meeting their goals. Is that all
teary-eyed liberal rehabilitation stuff? Or is it better to throw the
guy in for 18 months? I think it's a very legitimate use of the motion for reconsideration.
Roig-Franzia & Mosk, supra note 209 (interviewing Howard County Circuit
Court Judge Dennis Sweeny).
261. Anne Arundel County Circuit Judge Joseph Manck testified before the
House Judiciary Committee that sentence modification was "a tremendous
tool we judges have. It's a very, very powerful incentive." Daniel LeDuc,
Maryland Judges oppose Resentencing Curb; Testimony is on Bill to Set J-Year
Limit, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2002, at CA13.
262. "I believe very strongly that somebody who has a motion for modification
pending is going to be a better prisoner." Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences
Without Finality, supra note 5 (quoting Joseph Murphy, Chief Judge of the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland). This view is also held by many who
work in the corrections system. Patricia Cushwa, the Chair of the Maryland
Parole Commission, believes that the carrot-stick approach that is furthered
by the possibility of sentence revision has a positive effect within Maryland's
penal institution. Interview with Patricia Cushwa, Chair of the Maryland
Parole Commission (Sept. 17,2003).
263.
The hope for a reduction in sentence is foremost in a prisoner's mind and has a substantial effect on a prisoner's performance in prison .... The court should have the right to look at an
inmate's conduct in prison. When a motion for reconsideration is
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sentences as well. Judges in Maryland often use sentence revision as a
way of granting convicted defendants PBJ. PBJ is a means by which a
judge can reward a defendant by having the conviction wiped off his
record if he achieves the specific goals set by the judge. Many judges
report changing a defendant's sentence to PBJ after completion of a
prison sentence or after successful completion of the conditions of his
probation. 264 Many judges believe that offenders are likely to work
harder to achieve these goals if they know they can come back before
the same judge to demonstrate that their salutary behavior is now deserving of probation before judgment.
Those who argue against the need for sentence revision note that
the judge can sentence the defendant to PBJ at the time when the
original sentence is imposed. 265 Should the defendant not abide by
the conditions set by the judge, the probation can be revoked and the
judge can impose any sentence that could have been imposed originally. Although this might be a satisfactory alternative in some cases,
judges cite several limitations. First, pursuant to the statute, it cannot
be used in all cases; for example, a second conviction for drug possession or any sentence over three years for District Court and five years
for Circuit Court. 266 Second, this procedure does not give the judge
as much control as sentence reduction. With PBJ, judges are dependent upon the probation authorities to notify them if the defendant
has violated the terms of the probation. With sentence reduction, the
burden is upon the defendant to come before the judge and demonstrate that the conditions have been met. 267
A final motivational advantage of the possibility of sentence revision
involves the use of the defendant to assist in the capture of other
criminals or in their prosecution. Sentenced defendants can be
brought back before the judge and have their sentences reduced pursuant to an agreement with the prosecutor either that they disclose
information the police need in a criminal investigation or that they
agree to testify for the prosecution in cases related or unrelated to
their own conviction. 268

264.
265.

266.
267.
268.

pending, the one person the inmate wants to impress the most is
the sentencing judge.
STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at 7 (describing statement of Committee
member Joseph Vallario).
See supra Part VI.C.2.
STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at 7. Robert Dean, an Anne Arundel
County State's Attorney and Committee member said "[t]he legislature has
dealt with this issue by providing for probation before judgment and a fiveyear period of probation." Id.
Crimes which are exempted from PBJ are listed at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
PROC. § 6-220(d) (2001). See also id. § 6-227.
STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at 7 (detailing statements of Judge
Anthony Vaughn and Chief Judge Joseph Murphy).
At least five judges reported in the survey that they had reduced sentences
pursuant to the revisory power due to the defendant's cooperation with the
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Process and Goals

During the 2002 session of the Maryland General Assembly, a bill
was introduced to limit the power of judges to revise the sentences of
convicted offenders downward pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345. 270
In response to the proposal, representatives of the MSBA testified
before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Delegates. The crux
of this testimony was that before action was taken to alter or revoke
the revisory power of judges more information was needed, beyond
merely the anecdotal, regarding the frequency and the manner in
which judges use the revisory power. 271
While the above referenced bill never made it through the House
of Delegates, the MSBA believed that any future consideration of the
revisory power would benefit greatly from information gathered from
court files and the views of judges concerning judicial use of this
power. Accordingly, the MSBA formed a Task Force consisting of
Buzz Winchester of the MSBA and Professors Jose Anderson, Stephen
Shapiro and Steven Grossman (Chair), all of the University of Baltimore School of Law. As part of this process, a survey designed to gain
some insight into their practices and beliefs about the revisory power
was sent to all Maryland Circuit Court and District Court judges.
The survey instrument272 was developed after consultation with the
Maryland Sentencing Commission, representatives of the Conference
of Circuit Court Judges, Maryland District Court Judges and Chief
Judge Joseph Murphy of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
Of the approximately 250 surveys sent out, seventy-six were returned. The Survey was designed not to get hard numbers (in large
part because the judges have no real access to these numbers), but to
ascertain the approaches that judges take and their reasons for doing
so. Therefore, while the study does not yield results of a highly empirical nature, the seventy-six surveys that were returned reveal some

269.
270.
271.

272.

police or prosecution. See supra Part VI. One judge reported a case in
which a defendant had been sentenced to thirty years, all but fifteen suspended after his conviction for caIjacking and robbery with a deadly
weapon. Id. In exchange for the defendant's cooperation and testimony in
a murder prosecution, the judge revised the sentence to thirty years, all but
two suspended. Id.
The survey data is available for review in the office of Professor Steven
Grossman at the University of Baltimore School of Law.
S. 73, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2002); H.D. 160, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Md. 2002).
MD. STATE BAR Assoc., 2003 PRELIMINARY STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM: JUDICIAL Po\VER TO REVISE CRIMINAL SENTENCES (2003), available at http://www.
msba.org/sec_comm/lawcomm/legislativeprogram/legislprogram.htm.
Infra Appendix.
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clear trends regarding how judges approach and exercise the revisory
power and do allow for the drawing of some significant conclusions.
The SUIVey was divided into two parts. The first part asked questions about the general approaches that the judges take when they
receive a motion for sentence modification. 273 The second part asked
the judges to recall specific instances in which sentence modification
was granted and asked questions about those cases. 274

B.

Results of First Part of Survey

1.

How often granted?

Approximately seventy percent of judges reported that they granted
motions for modification either never or rarely-thirty-nine out of
fifty-six of those who responded appropriately to this question. The
others said that they granted sentence modification motions
frequently.
2.

How long after the motion is filed?

The judges were asked how often they granted motions for sentence
modification more than one year after the motion was made and how
often after more than five years. The clear response of the judges was
that the majority of motions for sentence modification that are
granted occur within the first year of the defendant's sentencing.
When looking at the second time period, the overwhelming result of
the SUIVey was that judges rarely granted modification motions after
five years.
Of the cases in which they granted sentence modification, most
judges reported that only five percent or fewer of those modifications
granted occur outside the one-year period-thirty-nine out of sixtyfive judges reporting used a figure of five percent or less. Of the cases
in which they granted sentence modification, over 4/5 of the judges
reported that only one percent of those modifications granted occurred outside the five-year period-fifty-three of sixty-three reporting
used a figure of one percent or less.
3.

How often do defendants file motions for modification?

The response of the judges revealed no pattern as to what percentage of defendants file motions for modification. The numbers varied
widely, from very few-one, five, and ten percent-to very manyninety, ninety-five, and one-hundred percent. This may reflect the
fact that judges have varying reputations for how seriously they consider modification motions, and accordingly defense attorneys routinely file motions with some judges and do not with others.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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How often were hearings held?

Judges were asked how often they granted hearings when modification motions were made to them. Most judges said they granted hearings less than half of the time such motions were made-fifty-one of
seventy-one judges reporting used the figure of fifty percent or less.
As to the judges who reported granting hearings more than half the
time, the percentage of hearings granted varied widely-up to ninety
and one-hundred percent of the time for a few of the judges.
5.

When hearings were held, how often was there no objection to
sentence modification from the prosecutor?

Judges were asked whether in cases in which hearings were held,
how often the prosecutor objected to the defendant's receiving some
sort of sentence modification. Most judges reported that in the majority of cases, prosecutors made no objection to the granting of some
sentence modification-forty-five of sixty-five judges responding said
that prosecutors objected less than half of the time. Almost half of the
judges reported that prosecutors did not object to modification in seventy-five percent or more of such cases-thirty-one of sixty-five judges
responding.
6.

How often were motions for modification denied?

This question, similar to the Survey's first question, attempted to get
the judges to report in estimated numbers their sense of how often
they deny modification motions. A clear majority of the judges reported that they deny such motions seventy-five percent or more of
the time-forty of sixty-five judges responding. The numbers varied
widely for the other judges.
7.

What goals are to be achieved from holding the motion sub curia?

The judges were asked what goals they hoped would be achieved
while they held the motion sub curia. By far, the goal that appeared
most often on the Survey was that the defendant would make significant progress or complete a drug or alcohol rehabilitation programfifty of the seventy-six survey forms mentioned this. Other goals mentioned by a significant number of judges were: waiting to see if the
defendant paid monetary restitution (twenty-four); having the defendant successfully complete the period and terms of his probation
(eighteen); seeing whether the defendant would stay out of trouble in
one manner or another (twelve); seeing whether the defendant would
complete or make significant progress in an educational program
(twelve); determining whether ~e defendant had been rehabilitated
(eleven); and seeing whether the defendant exhibited exemplary conduct while incarcerated (ten). Other goals mentioned less frequently
were: completing community service (four); recognizing that the de-
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fendant had been punished enough (four); to comply with the terms
of a plea bargain that modification be granted or considered (two); to
reflect the defendant's aging (one); giving the defendant a break as a
first offender (one); and seeing that the defendant complied with a
no contact order (one).
Clearly, the vast majority of the goals mentioned by the judges had
to do with determining if the defendant rehabilitated him or herself
in one manner or the other or that the defendant complied with
terms of the original sentence, such as making restitution, performing
community service or completing probation.
8.

What criteria were used in deciding whether modification should
be granted?

The judges were asked what criteria they used in deciding whether
to grant sentencing modification motions. Not surprisingly, the responses to this question were somewhat similar to the ones immediatelyabove.
This time, however, the question contained within it examples of
some of the criteria generally accepted as reasons for granting such a
motion: successful completion of an alcohol! drug/psychiatric treatment; exemplary conduct while serving a term of confinement; cooperation with law enforcement officers and/or prosecutors; payment of
restitution; illness or injury; family and/or community support. On
slightly less than half of the surveys returned-thirty-three out of seventy-six-judges simply wrote "all of the above" criteria were used. Of
the judges who chose to mention criteria individually, the one mentioned most was participation in alcohol or drug rehabilitation programs (thirty-four), followed by: paying restitution (seventeen);
completing probation (ten); exemplary conduct while incarcerated
(six); staying out of trouble (six); cooperation with police or prosecutors (six); performing community service (five); becoming rehabilitated (four); participation in educational programs (four); illness or
age (four); that the crime was a first offense (three); attempting to
ameliorate the impact of changing parole guidelines (two); and the
defendant's role as a victim (one).
C.

Results of Second Part of the Survey

The judges were asked to detail three cases in which sentencing
modification was granted.
1.

What offense was the defendant convicted of when modification
granted?

In providing examples of cases in which sentencing modification
was granted, judges were asked first to state the offense involved. The
most significant finding that emerged from this question was that four
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classes of crimes were clearly mentioned most often by judges in the
examples they gave. Those four were: theft offenses (twenty-one);
driving while intoxicated or impaired (nineteen); simple possession of
drugs (seventeen); and sale or possession with intent to distribute
drugs (fifteen). Other classes of crimes mentioned were: some type of
assault (six); robbery or attempted robbery (five); burglary or housebreaking (five); child abuse or contributing to the delinquency of a
minor (three); manslaughter voluntary and involuntary (two); violation of probation (two); driving with a suspended license (one); murder (one); arson (one); and rape (one).
2.

Other information provided involving specific examples cited.

The remainder of the information supplied by the judges does not
lend itself to quantifiable findings, and even if it did, as the cases are
self-selected, examples would not yield figures of any real empirical
value. Still, the kinds of cases offered by the judges and their reasons
for modifYing sentences offer important insights into their practices.
The examples offered suggest that judges frequently use the revisory power to remove a criminal conviction in cases involving defendants who have succeeded in rehabilitating themselves in some
meaningful way and whose further recovery may be negatively impacted by a criminal conviction on their record. Many of the examples mentioned involved typical drug possession or driving under the
influence cases in which defendants that successfully completed drug
or alcohol rehabilitation programs had their sentences of probation
or short jail terms modified to PBJ.
There were, however, other cases involving more serious crimes,
such as the man convicted of second degree assault for beating his
wife who successfully completed a domestic violence program, went
through intensive counseling with his wife and whose future employment prospects were seriously hampered by his conviction. Also,
there was the woman suffering from a mental illness who had consensual sex with a minor that led to a conviction for contributing to the
delinquency of a minor. She was awarded a PBJ after fully complying
with the terms of her probation, obtaining psychiatric help and after a
letter from her psychiatrist requesting the modification. One judge
spoke of a serious case of arson in which a young man suffering from
mental illness burned down the house of his grandparents. The judge
required and received monthly letters from the defendant co-signed
by the grandparents detailing the progress in his treatment, his activities and his plans. Mter some time, the judge modified his sentence
of probation and gave the young man a PBJ. The judge reported that
the young man recently graduated from the University of Maryland
with a degree in engineering. Another judge told of a serious drug
case in which the defendant had his sentence changed to a PBJ two

42

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 33

years after the original sentence and upon the defendant's successfully completing Job Corps and his acceptance into the U.S. Army.
Some judges have used the revisory power to shorten the jail
sentences of defendants, occasionally in cases involving serious
crimes. Often this is done because the judge finds that the defendant
had an exemplary record within the correctional institution and that
concrete steps have been taken by the defendant to deal with the root
causes of what led him to commit the crime. Typical of such cases is a
young man whose original sentence of ten years in prison was modified to three years because he had an excellent institutional record,
took advantage of programs available to him, had the full support of
his family and the fact that the crime for which he was incarcerated
was his first offense.
In other cases, judges sought to change the sentence of defendants
once they had served time in prison and were succeeding after their
release. A defendant who had served prison time for manslaughter
and had been released had his sentence modified nine years after his
original sentence because of the nature of his crime (as a seventeen
year old he shot a friend), his educational advancements while in
prison, his remorse, and the fact that at the time of the modification,
the defendant was gainfully employed and had the support of his family. At times, judges have used the revisory power to allow defendants
to leave jailor prison early in order to enter intensive drug rehabilitation programs at the time when beds become available.
In still other cases, judges reported using their revisory power to
address what they believed was a clear injustice. In one case, a man
who was sentenced to eighteen months in jail for violating his parole
on an original conviction of criminal contempt for failing to make
child support payments had his sentence modified when a belated
DNA test revealed he was not the father. One judge reported modifying a sentence nine years after the motion was filed because of the
facts surrounding the defendant's original conviction and sentence.
In this case, a retired judge had offered the defendant a concurrent
sentence if he pled guilty to robbery with a dangerous weapon. The
defendant refused the offer and upon being convicted after trial, received consecutive sentences that were ten to twenty years higher than
those he would have received under the guidelines that were adopted
after his sentence. The reporting judge modified the sentence to conform to the guidelines then in existence and noted that this also
avoided the need to deal with the defendant's claim that his sentence
was retaliation for rejecting the original plea. Another judge reported
a defendant's receiving a mandatory twenty-five year no parole sentence for being a repeat violent offender. The violent offense for
which he was convicted was daytime housebreaking in which the defendant stole a watch and some jewelry. His prior violent crimes were
also daytime housebreaking convictions. Shortly after the defendant
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was sentenced, the General Assembly removed daytime housebreaking from the list of violent crimes. The judge modified the defendant's sentence down to ten years.

D.

Suroey Conclusions

The results of the Survey indicate that a clear m;:yority of the motions for sentence modification that are granted occur within one year
of the time that the motion is filed. An overwhelming majority of
those granted occur within the first five years after the motion is filed.
It is also clear from the Survey that in a majority of cases in which
modification is granted, such modification occurs without the objection of the prosecution. Although some crimes for which sentencing
modification is granted are serious or violent felonies, the survey results suggest strongly that sentence modification is used, by far, most
often for cases concerning theft, drugs, and driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
It is clear that judges use their power of revision to achieve various
goals, most frequently ones related to the offender's ability to rehabilitate him or herself in one way or another or to address the damage
resulting from the crime, such as by paying restitution. The direct
result of judicial modification of sentences is that defendants receive a
sentence that reduces or mitigates the sentence that was originally
meted out to them. One indirect, but inevitable, result of this is that
there will be an increase in the disparity of sentences given to defendants who com~it the same crime. In a system that prizes consistency
above all and is based on retribution as the primary, if not exclusive,
theory of punishment (such as the federal sentencing system of
mandatory guidelines), the use of a judicial revisory power would be
anathema. In a system such as that which exists in Maryland, where
theories of rehabilitation, retribution and deterrence are all accepted
theories of punishment and where judges are afforded significantly
more sentencing discretion than in the federal system, many judges
believe that some disparity is a worthwhile price to pay in order to be
able to tailor a sentence to the needs of the defendant and the community in specific cases. The vast majority of judges who responded to
this Survey believe that the revisory power allows them the time and
flexibility they need to better inform their determination of how best
to accomplish these sentencing goals.
VII.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

This Article has reviewed the power of sentencing judges in Maryland to modify a defendant's sentence. Maryland gives its judges
some of the broadest powers and longest modification power of any
state. They may reduce a sentence at any time during its duration, for
any reason they deem proper, so long as the defendant has made a
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motion within ninety days of sentencing and the revised sentence stays
above any statutory minimum.
Not surprisingly, such broad power has its critics, and attempts have
been made during the last several legislative sessions to put a one-year
time limit on it. There is every reason to believe that this controversy
will not go away, and that new attempts will be made to restrict the
power of Maryland judges to modify sentences.
The authors of this Article believe that this judicial power should
not be eliminated or significantly curtailed. In Maryland, judges are
given great discretion at the time of sentencing to determine the
proper punishment for the defendant, and they remain in the best
position to determine later, whether this punishment should be
changed. The authors believe that this judicial power compliments,
rather than usurps, the executive parole function. It can be quite
helpful, particularly in fulfilling the rehabilitative purposes of our penal system. If there have been a small number of abuses or bad decisions in the past, the new rules calling for victim notification and for
judges to give their reasons for sentence reduction in open court
should go a long way toward solving any existing problems.
The study done by the authors of this Article has shown that many
judges use the possibility of sentence reduction as an effective incentive to shape a defendant's behavior, most often to complete drug or
alcohol treatment. Establishing a one-year time limit would greatly
interfere with this ability, because one year is often too short a period
to determine if the defendant has completed the ne.cessary steps to
change his behavior.
Although, in the final analysis, the authors do not believe that any
time limitation is necessary, if one is to be imposed, then a five-year
period would be a more reasonable compromise. Under no circumstances, however, should a limit shorter than three years be imposed.
Anything less than three years will severely interfere with the power of
sentence reduction as a useful tool for changing defendants'
behavior.
There has also been some consideration of eliminating or limiting
the power in cases of violent crime. This is a more difficult, complicated question. On the one hand, judges appear to use this power
very sparingly and only after careful consideration. On the other
hand, the victims of violent crime and the public in general believe
that dangerous, violent criminals should be kept off the streets for all,
or at least the majority, of their original sentences.
It should be remembered that judges are already somewhat limited
in their power to reduce the sentences of many violent offenders due
to mandatory sentences for certain crimes. While this is a closer question, the authors believe that no other restrictions are necessary.
Judges can continue to make these difficult decisions on a case-by-case
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basis, just as they do at sentencing, under the scrutiny of prosecutors,
victims, and the public.
If, however, judges' ability to modify the sentences of those convicted of crimes of violence is restricted, it should not be completely
eliminated. There should still be some period of time, no shorter
than 180 days, for the judge to reconsider- any sentence, including for
a serious, violent crime. The majority of states give judges this power,
so they can reconsider whether a sentence is too harsh, or was handed
down without adequate consideration of all relevant factors.
One thing that was determined during the research for this Article
is that it was very difficult to get an accurate picture of when and how
sentence reduction was being used, due to inadequate record keeping
at the county level. There should be a requirement that judges transmit, and counties maintain, a record of each use of this power. This
would make it much easier in the future to evaluate its use and/or
abuse.
We also believe that the current requirement that a defendant file a
motion for modification within ninety days is neither necessary nor
helpful. Under current law, it would seem to be malpractice for a
lawyer not to make this motion in every case, even though in most
cases the judge is not asked to act on it immediately. Even though it
may appear highly unlikely at the time of sentencing that the judge
will ever modify the defendant's sentence, it is impossible to predict
what might happen years into the future. Because there is no risk and
little cost in time to file such a pro forma motion, and the consequences could be so devastating if it is neglected, it should always be
filed.
But a motion that is, or should be, made in every case, merely to
preserve a defendant's right to ask for modification years into the future (usually based on circumstances that haven't yet occurred) serves
no valid purpose. It would make much more sense to require the
motion at the time the defendant is actively seeking modification,
based on facts or factors that are present at the time of the motion. If
there is a time limit imposed on the judges' power, then the limit for
making the motion should be ninety or 180 days before that limit.
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APPENDIX
Please circle the most accurate term:
I (~) (~) (cl1ru) grant a motion for modification.
In approximately what percentage of the cases for which you have
granted modification has it been over one (1) year: _ _ %; over five
(5) years: _ _ %; after the motion was filed.
Please Hn in the appropriate information:
Approximately _ _ % of the defendants I sentenced have filed a
motion for modification.
I have held hearings in approximately __ % of the cases in which I
was asked to modify a defendant's sentence.
In approximately __ % of the cases in which I held a hearing on a
motion for modification, the State did not object to the defendant
receiving some sort of modification.
General questions:
In approximately what percentage of cases have you denied a motion for modification? _ _ %
In cases in which you held a motion for modification sub curia, what
are the goals that you hoped the defendant would achieve?
What criteria have you used in deciding motions for modification
(e.g., successful completion of alcohol! drug/ psychiatric treatment;
exemplary conduct while serving a term of confinement; cooperation
with law enforcement officers and/or prosecutors; payment of restitution; illness or injury; family and/or community support)?
To the extent you are reasonably able, please provide the following
information about cases in which you granted a motion for modiHcation of sentence:
Case No. I (we appreciate that providing this information takes
time, but please provide us with as many cases as time permits)
The offense that the defendant committed:
The sentence initially imposed:
The period of time between the initial sentence and the modified
sentence:
The modified sentence:
The reason(s) why the motion was granted:
Case No.2
The offense that the defendant committed:
The sentence initially imposed:
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The period of time between the initial sentence and the modified
sentence:
The modified sentence:
The reason(s) why the motion was granted:
Case No.3

The offense that the defendant committed:
The sentence initially imposed:
The period of time between the initial sentence and the modified
sentence:
The modified sentence:
The reason(s) why the motion was granted:

